Who are the best researchers in the field of prediction markets?

No GravatarI have just visited plenty of scholars&#8216- websites, and I noted that the 2 websites where I could download the most papers on prediction markets were:

Robin Hanson

Justin Wolfers

Many (otherwise smart and friendly) researchers in our field don&#8217-t understand how important it is to have a clean, comprehensive website, alas. Papers should be linked to and ready for download.

Young researcher to monitor: Richard Borghesi, who is deeply into TradeSports. Interesting person, whose work doesn&#8217-t get enough blog or media coverage, in my judgment.

Previous blog posts by Chris F. Masse:

  • Robin Hanson wants to rule the world —just as CEOs and heads of states do for a living.
  • Predictify got funded… Great for those who will be hired… But is it a good thing, overall?
  • Nassim Nicholas Taleb likens modern-day financial markets to medicine in the 1800s, when going to a hospital in London or Paris multiplied your risk of death by four times, he says. Similarly, quants increase risk by deploying flawed financial tools designed to reduce it, he argues.
  • TradeSports-InTrade — Check Deposits
  • BetFair Australia fought for free trade across Australian state boundaries… and won.

Robin Hanson is breaking the Internet.

No GravatarVia Gawker (which I&#8217-m paraphrasing), the New York Times warns us that there might not be enough Internet left for the rest of us!

In a widely cited report published last November, a research firm projected that user demand for the Internet could outpace network capacity by 2011.

It&#8217-s true: there is only so much Internet, and Robin Hanson and his folks at OvercomingBias.com (a boring philosophy blog, where the prof blablates on angels&#8217- gender with his students) are using like all of it. Look at the damming evidence, the trend shows clearly that the implosion of the known Universe is next:

OvercomingBias

Maybe the gullible and intrepid Robin Hanson fanboys will take comfort in the fact, reminded to us by Gawker, that engineer Robert Metcalfe predicted in 1995 that the Internet would suffer from a &#8220-catastrophic collapse&#8221- in 1996. :-D

Read the previous blog posts by Chris F. Masse:

  • Business Risks & Prediction Markets
  • Brand-new BetFair bet-matching logic proves to be very controversial with some event derivative traders.
  • Jimmy Wales accused of editing Wikipedia for donations.
  • What the prediction market experts said on Predictify
  • Are you a MSR addict like Mike Giberson? Have nothing to do this week-end? Wanna trade on a play-money prediction exchange instead of watching cable TV? Wanna win an i-Phone?
  • The secret Google document that Bo Cowgill doesn’t want you to see
  • BetFair’s brand-new matching-bet logic is endorsed by the Chairman of the Midas Oracle Advisory Board.

Predictocracy = Market Mechanisms for Public and Private Decision Making

No GravatarRobin Hanson:

[&#8230-] The main problem with using [Michael] Abramowicz&#8217-s book as a &#8220-technical manual&#8221-, however, is that he&#8217-s never actually seen, much less touched, most of the blocks he describes. His conclusions are not supported or tested by math models, computer simulations, lab experiments, field trials, nor a track record of successful past proposals – it is all based on his untested intuitions. And he doesn&#8217-t seem inclined to do any such testing himself – he hopes his book will inspire others to do that. There is of course a spectrum of rigor in how solidly one can support a claim. Most business decisions are based on far less rigor that elite academics often demand, and there is surely a place for &#8220-brainstorming&#8221- speculation. Compared with most academics, I admit I have often been more than toward the speculation end of the spectrum, though I have tried to test my speculations via math models, lab experiments, field trials, and have arguably collected a modest track record of success. [&#8230-]

Michael Abramowicz&#8217-s response:

[&#8230-] The incentives provided by two of my technical proposals (the decentralized subsidy approach and the nobody-loses prediction market) are sufficiently straightforward to me that math seems superfluous to me, though I agree that field tests comparing these with alternatives would be useful. Two of the proposals (the text-authoring market and the market web) could certainly benefit from experimentation, but the software needed to implement them would be considerably more complicated than what is needed for existing prediction markets. [&#8230-]

Robin Hanson&#8217-s second take.

Michael Abramowicz&#8217-s post.

Robin Hanson on futarchy vs. predictocracy.

Michael Abramowicz.

Robin Hanson.

I will blog about this book, once I have read it, in the near future.

Predictocracy = Market Mechanisms for Public and Private Decision Making

All the book is online, at the web address above. You can also buy it at bookshops, or at Amazon.

Predictocracy

Read the previous blog posts by Chris F. Masse:

  • Many people twitter on prediction markets.
  • Folks, when you have something important to say, write up a full post, not a comment.
  • Prediction Market Journalism
  • TechCrunch is 221 times bigger than Midas Oracle.
  • Earthquake measuring 9.0 or more on Richter scale to occur anywhere on or before December 31, 2008
  • Why Midas Oracle (and not TV news shows or print newspapers) will dominate the future.
  • The Six Degrees Of Separation

Prediction market sessions of the OReilly Money-Tech Conference suffer fatally from the absence of the worlds most knowledgeable, most innovative and most trustworthy prediction market expert.

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O&#8217-Reilly Money-Tech Conference – 2008-02-06~07

Predicting the Future of Prediction Markets + Google as Prediction Market

Wharton&#8217-s Justin Wolfers, Google&#8217-s Bo Cowgill, Inkling&#8217-s Adam Siegel, and Sean Park (representing Himself).

No more Robin Hanson. :(

Better to stay home watching a re-play of the December 2006&#8217-s Yahoo! Confab, where Robin Hanson does appear.

Confab Yahoo! on prediction markets – Streaming Video: 100k300k – 2006-12-13

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UPDATE: Robin Hanson comments&#8230-

I was invited, but the date conflicted with a SETI conference I&#8217-ll be speaking at.

Organizational Sociology & Googles Enterprise Prediction Markets

Graduate student Ben Spigel&#8217-s comment on Richard Florida&#8217-s blog:

About a decade ago, a group of cognitive scientists looking at Bell Labs found that all things being equal, the chances of two scientists collaborating was 4 times higher if they had offices in the same hallway, than if there was a turn in the hall between them. Basically, people are lazy about talking to other people. There&#8217-s a noticeable drop in communication when you have to turn your neck to see someone.

Reminder:

Robin Hanson in a comment on Marginal Revolution:

This is important work for organizational sociology, but not for prediction markets, as this does little to help us find and field high value markets.

Reminder:

Robin Hanson:

Info Value = the added accuracy the markets provide relative to other mechanisms, times the value that accuracy can give in improved decisions, minus the cost of maintaining the markets, relative to the cost of other mechanisms.

A highly accurate market has little value if other mechanisms can provide similar accuracy at a lower cost, or if few substantial decisions are influenced by accurate forecasts on its topic.

Related Links:

Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence From Google – (PDF file – PDF file) – by Bo Cowgill (Google economic analyst), Justin Wolfers (University of Pennsylvania) and Eric Zitzewitz (Dartmouth College)


Author Profile&nbsp-Editor and Publisher of Midas Oracle .ORG .NET .COM &#8212- Chris Masse&#8217-s mugshot &#8212- Contact Chris Masse &#8212- Chris Masse&#8217-s LinkedIn profile &#8212- Chris Masse&#8217-s FaceBook profile &#8212- Chris Masse&#8217-s Google profile &#8212- Sophia-Antipolis, France, E.U. Read more from this author&#8230-


Read the previous blog posts by Chris. F. Masse:

  • Are David Pennock’s search engine prediction markets the worst marketing disaster since the New Coke?
  • Midas Oracle is incontestably [*] the best vertical portal to prediction markets.
  • Comment spam paid by Emile Servan-Schreiber of NewsFutures-Bet2Give
  • BetFair Games needs a Swedish provider to develop its gambling offerings.
  • When Markets Beat the Polls – Scientific American Magazine
  • Robin Hanson has some fanboy in India. Great. Tiny caveat: The parroting Indian writer does not acknowledge Robin Hanson by name.
  • Molecular Nanotechnology

Rushkoff on Crowd Sourcing

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Douglas Rushkoff answering this year&#8217-s Edge question:

The Internet. I thought that it would change people. I thought it would allow us to build a new world through which we could model new behaviors, values, and relationships. &#8230- For now, at least, it&#8217-s turned out to be different. &#8230- The open source ethos has been reinterpreted through the lens of corporatism as &#8220-crowd sourcing&#8221- – meaning just another way to get people to do work for no compensation.

Unfortunately, that&#8217-s close to the truth for most play-money prediction market business plans.

Robin Hansons concept of… Info Value

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Robin Hanson:

Info Value = the added accuracy the markets provide relative to other mechanisms, times the value that accuracy can give in improved decisions, minus the cost of maintaining the markets, relative to the cost of other mechanisms.

A highly accurate market has little value if other mechanisms can provide similar accuracy at a lower cost, or if few substantial decisions are influenced by accurate forecasts on its topic.

Wow, great formula. [BTW, I have slightly edited RH’s first sentence.]

I&#8217-m sure Mike Giberson will write another blog post for Midas Oracle about that formula &#8212-all that for free. Crowd-sourcing works for me. :-D

Who did best in explaining the prediction markets to the lynching crowd?

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After the New Hampshire fiasco, 16 18 people came to defend the prediction markets, so far. So far, the best takes are from:

  1. George Tziralis
  2. Robin Hanson
  3. Jonathan Kennedy
  4. and I&#8217-ll give the 4th spot to a combo, mixing takes from John Tierney, Adam Siegel (surprisingly pertinent &#8211-I bet he is on a fish diet, post Christmas :-D ), and Steve Roman.
  5. UPDATE: &#8220-Thrutch&#8220-, Emile Servan-Schreiber and Panos Ipeirotis.

AWOLs (so far): PMIA, AEI-Brookings, InTrade, TradeSports, BetFair, TradeFair, NewsFutures, Emile Servan-Schreiber, Jed Christiansen, Koleman Strumpf, Bo Cowgill, Richard Borghesi, Chris Hibbert, David Perry, Ken Kittlitz, Paul Tetlock, David Pennock, Mike Linksvayer, Brent Stinsky, David Yu, Mark Davis, David Jack, James Surowiecki, Tyler Cowen, Greg Mankiw, Donald Luskin, John Delaney [*], etc.

[*] Steve Bass tells us that John Delaney&#8217-s pre-NH CNBC appearance was awesome. I was up that day, waiting for that CNBC segment, but failed to spot it. If somebody sends me the YouTube link, I&#8217-ll publish it here.

Prediction markets are forecasting tools of convenience that feed on advanced indicators.

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Why were the political prediction markets so wrong about Barak Obama and Hillary Clinton in New Hampshire?

&#8230-asks Slate&#8217-s Daniel Gross &#8212-via Mister Usability (Alex Kirtland), who needs to go and get his own gravatar.

So, I&#8217-ve been watching the action in one of the political futures markets this evening, Intrade. And the action in this prediction market has reinforced my opinion that these are less futures markets than immediate-past markets. The price movement tends to respond to conventional wisdom and polling data- it doesn&#8217-t lead them.

Throughout the day and into the early evening, while polls were still open, Democratic investors, mimicking the post-Iowa c.w. and polls, believed Obama was highly likely to be the Democratic nominee. The Obama contract was trading in the lows 70s, meaning investors believed he had a 70 percent chance of being the nominee, while Hillary Clinton contracts were in the 20s. […] At 6 p.m., this market had written Hillary Clinton&#8217-s entire presidential campaign off. At 9:30 p.m., it was calling a dead heat. What caused investors to change their minds so drastically in the space of a couple of hours? A few data points that went against the day&#8217-s prevailing conventional wisdom and polls. […]

See also Niall O&#8217-Connor&#8217-s assessment:

I am looking forward to the post New Hampshire Caucus, when all you prediction market advocates crawl out from under your stones. For the record at one point the market on Intrade and Betfair was suggesting that Obama had a 95% probability of winning the caucas- whilst Intrade had him at 77% to win the nomination.A case perhaps of both the foolery of crowds and, the market biting back.

New Hampshire will go down as the Black Wednesday of prediction markets and unless there is now objective transparent debate (as opposed to the usual biased sabre rattling) – prediction markets will be dead in the water.

My answer to Dan Gross&#8217- legitimate question and to Niall O&#8217-Connor&#8217-s snarky comment:

  1. Prediction markets are forecasting tools of convenience that feed on advanced indicators. When those advanced indicators are wrong, the prediction markets are wrong.
  2. If you prefer the polls or the pundits, your call &#8212-but polls and pundits were also wrong, this time, right? Required reading for mister Niall O&#8217-Connor: &#8220-New Hampshire&#8217-s Polling Fiasco&#8221- + &#8220-Analysis: pundits eat crow&#8220-.
  3. The ultimate forecasting tool would be a way to reverse our psychological arrow of time &#8212-so as to remember the future instead of the past. Only science-fiction writers and some imbecile ( :-D ) believe in that.
  4. The prediction market approach is to stick with the markets, on the long term. Take their successes. Take their failures. Unlike Donald Luskin and Markos Moulitsas, Chris Masse will not turn against the prediction markets when they fail punctually. What counts is the long series.
  5. My first point should be included in the prediction markets approach definition, in my view, but others (like economist Michael Giberson) might have different opinions.
  6. With respect to my first point, I bet that the prediction markets will never replace the polls as the forecasting tool of choice for political analysts &#8212-on that particular point (but not on a myriad of others), I break away from Justin Wolfers&#8217- irrational exuberance and I side with Emile Servan-Schreiber of NewsFutures (my preferred play-money prediction exchange). Prediction market reporting will have a function, indeed (as suggests Justin Wolfers), but not the dominant function.
  7. Going forward, prediction market journalism should emphasize relative accuracy (as opposed to absolute accuracy) &#8212-that is, comparing prediction markets with polls and pundits, which is what Robin Hanson has said from day one. Our good friend Niall O&#8217-Connor has difficulty to compute that, apparently. He should eat more fish. :-D

&#8212-

Justin Wolfers:

In a few years, we may regard the second half of the 20th century as the aberration in which the press used polls rather than markets to track political races,” Justin Wolfers, a business professor at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School, wrote in an e-mail message. “And in the 21st century, we may return to the habits of the early 20th century, reporting on political races through the lens of prediction markets rather than polls.

Emile Servan-Scheiber:

1) The traders themselves are the first to look at the polls to inform their trades. So the polls are here to stay.

2) Our recent experience in Western Europe seems to indicate that the superior accuracy of markets over polls when predicting elections may be a U.S. artifact that isn’t so easily reproducible elsewhere. I’ve discussed this with Forrest Nelson of IEM [Iowa Electronic Markets], and apparently, ever since the Truman-Dewey polling debacle of 1948, U.S. pollsters have adopted a policy of reporting mostly raw numbers rather than projections based on sophisticated secret formulas, so they can’t be accused of manipulating opinion. However, raw numbers are notoriously unreliable when based on small samples, and Western European pollsters never report them, preferring instead to publish projections based on historically-informed statistical formulas. What we’ve observed in France and Holland is that it it’s very hard to beat the accuracy of such projections.

[I don’t make mine Emile Servan-Schreiber’s second point, but that’s a minor.]

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InTrade&#8217-s expired prediction markets:

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New Hampshire

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The Democrats

&#8212-

The Hillary Clinton event derivative was expired to 100.

Dem NH Clinton

Dem NH Obama

Dem NH Edwards

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The Republicans

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The John McCain event derivative was expired to 100.

Rep NH McCain

Rep NH Romney

Rep NH Huckabee

Rep NH Giuliani

&#8212-

Iowa

&#8212-

The Democrats.

The Barack Obama event derivative was expired to 100.

Dem Iowa Obama

Dem Iowa Clinton

Dem Iowa Edwards

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The Republicans

The Mike Huckabee event derivative was expired to 100.

Rep Iowa Huckabee

Rep Iowa omney

Rep Iowa McCain

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Source: InTrade

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[A more complete prediction market reporting should have included expired contracts from NewsFutures and BetFair. Sorry for that. Note that InTrade-TradeSports is the only exchange to offer a “closed contacts” section.]

&#8212-

NEXT: Prediction Markets 101 + Who did best in explaining the prediction markets to the lynching crowd? + After the New Hampshire fiasco, 16 people came to defend the prediction markets, so far. + The prediction markets deserve a fair trial. + Prediction Markets = the greatest time-saving invention of this century

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Markets for Telling CEOs to Step Down

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Robin Hanson (back in April 1996):

One of the biggest problems with existing corporate capitalism is keeping CEOs (chief executive officers) accountable to their shareholders. Unaccountable CEOs can give themselves huge salaries and perks, discriminate freely in hiring and promotion, and build empires rather than shareholder value.

In theory, boards of directors oversee CEOs, and can be sued by shareholders should they fail in that task. But in practice such failure is hard to prove, board members are often nominated by the CEO, and CEOs often put each other on their boards. In theory shareholders can dump the current board or CEO at annual meetings, but a commons greatly reduces the incentives for any one shareholder to mount an expensive campaign to find and convince other shareholders. In principle someone could buy out the whole company, dictate changes, and then sell the better-run company at a profit, but existing law and CEOs now lay many obstacles in this path.

The biggest problem with unaccountable CEOs is that they don&#8217-t know when to step down and let someone else run the company. The value of companies often jump when such a CEO dies. So a recent &#8220-Just Vote No&#8221- campaign focuses on this problem, and proposes that dissatisfied shareholders withhold their vote in a certain way, in order to signal they think the current management should step down. The companies with the highest no votes are then publicized, to try and shame management into action.

The main proponent of this Vote No campaign thinks the following proposal of mine has promise. I propose to create, for each stock, a separate market in that stock for trades which are &#8220-called-off&#8221- if the CEO does not step down in the next year. The price of the stock in this market should indicate the market&#8217-s expectation of the value of that company with a different CEO. If that stock price is consistently and significantly higher than the ordinary stock price, that should be a clear market signal, from informed traders, for the CEO to step down. (If there is no price, because there is no trading, then there is no signal.)

Ordinarily CEOs respond to statistics showing how poorly their company is fairing relative to similar companies by explaining how they are really different. And they respond to statistics of unhappy shareholders by pointing out how little incentives any one of them has to become well informed. These excuses should be blunted by my proposal, and board members may more plausibly fear legal action for ignoring these market signals.

This proposal is an example of a more general concept of policy markets.

Robin Hanson&#8217-s comment on my previous blog post:

You make a valid point about there being a difference between CEO futures and decision markets. It is the board, not the CEO, who we might hope would be willing to overrule the CEO ego. And I&#8217-ve had a web page arguing for CEO decision markets since 1996. [See above.]

Robin Hanson (in Forbes in 2006):

[…] My idea: Set up two new stock markets where investors would be making not outright bets on the future of a company but conditional bets. In one market the trades are consummated only if the current chief executive remains in place at the end of the current quarter. In the other market the trades are consummated only if the incumbent is bounced out by the end of the quarter. The price spread between these two markets would send a signal about whether the boss should stay or go.

Say Eisner is the current boss and you own one share of Disney you want to sell. Instead of selling on the New York Stock Exchange for, say, $30, you could do simultaneous sell orders, each for one share, on the two alternative markets. Perhaps Disney is trading in the Stays Put market at $29 and in the Early Retirement market at $31. If Eisner does keep his job, only the first trade becomes valid: You give up your share and get $29. If he gets the ax, only the second trade is valid and the buyer (probably a different buyer) gives you $31.

Just as the $30 price on the Big Board reflects the collective wisdom about the value of Disney, the $29 Stays Put and the $31 Early Retirement prices would reflect the collective wisdom about relative values under different management scenarios. Spreads would open up because sellers (or buyers) in the alternative markets would often do only one of the two trades. If you happen to think Disney is worth $30 a share overall but would be disappointed to see Eisner leave, you would sell only in the Early Retirement market. If he does get bounced, you&#8217-re happy to have the $31 cash- if he stays put, you are happy to continue owning the stock. On the other side of your trade: a hedge fund that thinks Disney would be worth $32 if a new manager came in.

The directors&#8217- job would be to listen to the markets. If a wide enough spread opens up in favor of a departure&#8211-maybe 1%&#8211-get out the pink slip. […]

Previously: PaddyPower&#8217-s betting lines on CEO exits + Marginal Revolution on CEO exit betting lines