Critical Mass Matters.

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An interesting article on the Fool re: Yahoo! is exiting the auctions market. Even more interesting however, is the testament of how even the biggest brands (Yahoo!) with even the most salient internet experiences (auctions), can fail due to the problem of not achieving a critical mass.

It&#8217-s hard to believe that on all of Yahoo! Sports Cards and Memorabilia auctions (186,000 listings) there are only 326 current bids (.2%). Given those types of numbers, I&#8217-m surprised they waited this long to get out.

When looking at some of the US prediction markets,

Inkling
WSX Exchange
HedgeStreet

Just looking at &#8220-the action&#8221-, their respective *active* user bases seem to be in the hundreds and low thousands. All seem to suffer from the basic malaise of not having a thriving critical mass user base.

Lesson de-jour: Get critical mass!

Nosco: Prediction Markets a la IEM

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Nosco:

A Prediction Market is a virtual share market. It is used to compile information.
1. Two shares are created on the Prediction Market. These shares describe an event, e.g. &#8220-Deadline can be met&#8221- and &#8220-Deadline CANNOT be met&#8221-. Each share pays 100 points if the given event occurs, and 0 points if the event does not occur. Thus, if the deadline is met, the first share pays 100, while the other share is worth nothing.
2. Invited are people who are believed to have relevant knowledge and information to trade in the shares.
3. The participants buy the share that they believe offers them the best chance of making money*. Thus, the price of the share that the majority of participants want to buy will increase- and the price of the share that no one believes in will decrease. In other words, the share price reflects the participants’ overall assessment of whether or not the event will occur.
*The money may be real, virtual or in the form of prizes.

I prefer when there is only one contract. So when you speculate on the &#8220-no&#8221- side of the bet, you simply short-sell the &#8220-yes&#8221- contract.

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Chris Hibbert&#8217-s Explainers:

  • PM Intro: Basic Formats – [simple double auctions] – by Chris Hibbert – 2005-12-30
  • PMs with Open-Ended Prices – [markets with open-ended prices] – by Chris Hibbert – 2006-01-05
  • Looking at Both Sides – [the symmetry of complementary purchases] – by Chris Hibbert – 2006-04-17
  • Market Design: Book and Market Maker – [how to integrate an order book with an automated market maker] – by Chris Hibbert – 2006-04-28
  • Increasing Liquidity in Multi-Outcome Claims – [the mechanics of multi-outcome markets] – by Chris Hibbert – 2006-07-19
  • Continuous Outcomes: Bands, Ladders, and Scaled Claims – [predicting the value of a continuous variable] – by Chris Hibbert – 2006-09-20
  • Integrating Book Orders and Market Makers – (mirror on MO) – by Chris Hibbert – 2006-09-20
  • Conditional and Combinatorial Betting – (mirror on MO) – by Chris Hibbert – 2007-03-06
  • Market Makers for Multi-Outcome Markets – (mirror on MO) – by Chris Hibbert – 2007-09-10

Economists Petition on Prediction Markets

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Statement on Prediction Markets – (Click here to read the abstract and download the petition from the SSRN site) – by Kenneth J. Arrow, Robert Forsythe, Michael Gorham, Robert Hahn, Robin Hanson, Daniel Kahneman, John O. Ledyard, Saul Levmore, Robert Litan, Paul Milgrom, Forrest D. Nelson, George R. Neumann, Charles R. Plott, Thomas C. Schelling, Robert J. Shiller, Vernon L. Smith, Erik Snowberg, Cass R. Sunstein, Paul C. Tetlock, Philip E. Tetlock, Hal R. Varian, Marco Ottaviani, Justin Wolfers, and Eric Zitzewitz – 2007-05-XX

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Executive Summary

Prediction markets are markets for contracts that yield payments based on the outcome of an uncertain future event, such as a presidential election. Using these markets as forecasting tools could substantially improve decision making in the private and public sectors. We argue that U.S. regulators should lower barriers to the creation and design of prediction markets by creating a safe harbor for certain types of small stakes markets. We believe our proposed change has the potential to stimulate innovation in the design and use of prediction markets throughout the economy, and in the process to provide information that will benefit the private sector and government alike.

Introduction

Prediction markets are markets for contracts that yield payments based on the outcome of an uncertain future event, such as a presidential election, the release date for new software, or the action taken by the Federal Reserve on short-term interest rates. A key benefit is that the market price of these contracts can potentially provide more accurate forecasts of future events than other methods. Using these markets as forecasting tools could substantially improve decision making in the private and public sectors. They also can help manage risk more efficiently. It is precisely because prediction markets have great potential that we think the government should facilitate rather than hinder the introduction of these markets.

There are significant regulatory barriers to establishing prediction markets in the United States, in part because they are potentially subject to gambling laws. We argue that U.S. regulators should lower barriers to the creation and design of prediction markets by creating a safe harbor for certain types of small stakes markets. We believe our proposed change has the potential to stimulate innovation in the design and use of prediction markets throughout the economy, and in the process to provide information that will benefit the private sector and government alike.

[…]

Conclusion

We believe prediction markets can significantly improve decision making in both the private and public sectors. One of the clear benefits of allowing small stakes, non-profit markets to operate would be the greater use of prediction markets to inform both public and private decision making. A second benefit would be that access to better information could promote greater transparency and accountability in decision making. A third benefit might be that other countries and regions would promote prediction markets with more sensible regulation. Finally, we think there would be benefits from the development of new knowledge on how to design prediction markets.

We are aware that Congress did not intend the CFTC to regulate gambling and we believe that it is important to design this safe harbor in such a fashion that socially valuable prediction markets can get in, but gambling markets cannot.

Prediction markets have great potential for improving economic welfare and the decisions of private and public institutions alike. To help achieve that potential, the regulatory impediments to the use of prediction markets in the U.S. should be lowered. Here, we have suggested one approach for reducing those regulatory barriers.

AEI-Brookings Joint Center – The views in this paper represent those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the institutions with which they are affiliated.

Kenneth J. Arrow – Stanford University

Robert Forsythe – University of South Florida

Michael Gorham – Illinois Institute of Technology

Robert Hahn – AEI-Brookings Joint Center

Robin Hanson – George Mason University

Daniel Kahneman – Princeton University

John O. Ledyard – California Institute of Technology

Saul Levmore – University of Chicago

Robert Litan – AEI-Brookings Joint Center

Paul Milgrom – Stanford University

Forrest D. Nelson – University of Iowa

George R. Neumann – University of Iowa

Charles R. Plott – California Institute of Technology

Thomas C. Schelling – University of Maryland

Robert J. Shiller – Yale University

Vernon L. Smith – George Mason University

Erik Snowberg – Stanford University

Cass R. Sunstein – University of Chicago

Paul C. Tetlock – University of Texas at Austin

Philip E. Tetlock – University of California at Berkeley

Hal R. Varian – University of California at Berkeley

Marco Ottaviani – London Business School

Justin Wolfers – University of Pennsylvania

Eric Zitzewitz – Stanford University

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Previous: Statement on Prediction Marketsby Robert Hahn – 2007-05-07

The Art Of SEO For Wikipedia

No GravatarExcellent article about how Wikipedia intersects with internet marketing.

SEOs obsess too much with Wikipedia, in my view.

Anyway.

Read the previous blog posts by Chris F. Masse:

  • Bzzzzzzzzz…
  • Bzzzzzzzzz…
  • “No offense, but I think Radley Balko is the most valuable blogger in America right now.”
  • Are you a better predictor than John McCain?
  • What does climate scientist James Annan think of InTrade’s global warming prediction markets?
  • Inkling Markets, one year later
  • One trader’s view on BetFair’s new bet-matching logic

FAKE WORLD BANK MEMO: Harvard professor of economics Kenneth Rogoff laughs in Paul Wolfowitzs face.

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BACKGROUND INFO: Kenneth Rogoff is a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution and professor of economics at Harvard University.

Felix Salmon (at Portfolio.com):

[…] In any case, you have to read Ken Rogoff&#8217-s spoof memo over at Foreign Policy. When someone of Rogoff&#8217-s stature can laugh in Wolfowitz&#8217-s face like this, you know it&#8217-s all over. […]

Previous: INSIDER TRADING: World Bank employees speculating on the Paul Wolfowitz event derivatives at InTrade-TradeSports?? – (blog post that links to and re-publishes the fake memo)

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#1. Funny.

#2. Free publicity for InTrade-TradeSports.

#3. On Midas Oracle, the policy is that if we publish fake material, we label it clearly as &#8220-humor&#8221- (among other, by selecting the&#8221-humor&#8221- post category&#8221-). See Niall O&#8217-Connor&#8217-s April 1st blog post on BoDog CEO being arrested in&#8230- Tora Bora, Afghanistan. :)

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Price for Paul Wolfowitz Resignation at intrade.com

Price for Paul Wolfowitz Resignation at intrade.com

A lesson in stock trading mechanics

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A simExchange player (jayen) recently asked about how prices adjust in the real stock market compared to how trading on the simExchange works. This question came from a special event on April 26 following Ubisoft Entertainment&#8217-s earnings announcement. Ubisoft had announced that it has sold 950,000 copies of Red Steel when the stock was only forecasting 478,600 copies (47.86 DKP). This resulted in a free arbitrage opportunity in which anyone buying the stock would be locking in guaranteed gains.

At the same time, anyone selling the stock at 47.86 DKP would be giving away money. Naturally, no rational person would be selling at 47.86 DKP if the news already reveals the stock should be worth over 95.00 DKP. Unfortunately, the simExchange relies on NPC market makers (NPC is a gaming term meaning &#8220-Non-Player Character&#8221-) that do not take news into account when they make markets and so the prices would not immediately reflect the news unless traders bought every automated ask order up to 95 DKP.

Remember, stock markets function in an auction system where a bidder and seller each have a price they are willing to buy and sell at. When there is a match&#8211-a buyer and a seller willing to transact at the same price&#8211-a trade is filled. Due to these mechanics, a stock’s price can easily jump from one trade to the next as the last traded price does not directly affect what price buyers and sellers can trade at next.

Following large news events, such as earnings releases, you will often see a jump in the stock price. A stock may have just traded at $100. News is released that shows the company is growing much faster than previously believed. The market makers now believe the stock is worth around $120 a share. They don’t just keep posting sell orders around $100 and let buyers gradually push the price of the stock to $100, they immediately post that they are willing to sell at no less than $120 a share. Buyers who believe the stock is worth more than $120 a share will immediately adjust their bid orders to $120 as they know they are not going to get the shares at $100. The stock price would immediately jump from $100 to $120 with no trades at any price in between.

As previously mentioned, the NPC market makers on the simExchange are not aware of news that should adjust their bid and ask prices. It is unrealistic for them to keep posting sell orders below 95 DKP if the news already shows the stock should be worth 95 DKP. As a result, the bid and ask orders were manually adjusted to compensate for this new information, as would be done in the real stock market.

It is easiest to notice and understand this by viewing what are called Level II Quotes (advanced trading mode on the simExchange). This view lets you see the order book: the collection of orders people are posting as offers to buy or sell. A trade only fills when someone submits an order that matches an order in order book. If there are no sell orders submitted at 50 DKP, then you cannot buy at 50 DKP. You can always submit an order to buy at 50 DKP and wait for a seller to come by who is wiling to take your offer. However, if there are no orders to sell below 90 DKP, then 90 DKP is the only price you can immediately buy at. This system is often referred as a &#8220-double call auction.&#8221-

Cross posted from A lesson in stock trading mechanics on the simExchange Official Blog.

Previously: Next lesson: so the “futures” aren’t really futures, So what exactly are these “futures?”, The structure of the simExchange stocks and An invitation to join the simExchange beta.

Saudi Arabia prediction markets, anyone??

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King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has said he does not want to go down in history as Mr. Bush’s Arab Tony Blair.

New York Times

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in Riyadh in March

Awad Awad/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in Riyadh in March, during a meeting of Arab heads of state in which he called the United States presence in Iraq “an illegal foreign occupation,” infuriating the White House.

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Saudi Arabia prediction markets, anyone??

Thanks, but No Thanks. Difficult to get info. Saudi Arabia is like a giant cult, with a two-tier population &#8212-the people, and the rulers (the multi-married &#8220-princes&#8221-, who proliferate like rabbits).

That&#8217-s why I think Robin Hanson made an error when he picked up the Middle East as the geopolitical target of his DARPA&#8217-s Policy Analysis Market. Mid-East politics is too arcane for us, Westerners. And the whole Iraq war mess shows you that the Americans, in particular, don&#8217-t get the Arabo-Muslim world.

Would Mid-East prediction markets with strong incentives and high participation improve our intelligence??? Yes, in theory. But, as we have seen on Midas Oracle in the past weeks, the scholars have great ideas for brand-new event derivatives, but&#8230- as I&#8217-m used to ask&#8230- how many divisions??? They have no traction.

The field of prediction markets is where great ideas meet their coffin. The emphasis is put on a bunch of aloof scholars just because they can use a scientific calculator. We need thinkers/managers who both can make us dream with socially relevant event derivatives and understand the practicalities of the prediction markets.

Beyond the Continuous Double Auction – Part II, Existing alternatives

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This is Part II of a series of posts examining alternatives to the Continuous Double Auction market. Part I, posted at my CASTrader Blog, examines the problems with Continuous Double Auctions. This Part II examines some existing alternatives to them.

Invention of new types of markets has experienced a relative renaissance in recent years (mainly by the people who hang around Midas Oracle), many of which I surveyed before on my blog, and new types of markets are being invented as we speak (PDF). It&#8217-s hard to keep up, and I will caution that I am by no means any kind of expert on market design. That said, let&#8217-s examine an old-school market, as well as one of the new inventions.

Call Auction Market. Ironically, what the New York Stock Exchange replaced in the 1800s when they adopted CDAs has some interesting properties and advantages. A call market is typically organized as a price scan auction which basically amounts to this: poll every market participant and ask them how much they would tenatively offer to buy or sell at a given price. The search continues until buy/sell demand is balanced, at which price the market is cleared. The call market was rightly abandoned in the 1800s as markets grew due to the impossibilities of managing them in the pre-electronic era. I imagine it was mind-numbingly boring for traders as well. Recently, though, other types of call markets, such as crossing networks that batch orders at prices set in CDA markets have re-emerged, and some researchers have called for a major revival of the old call market (you may want to turn your sound off before clicking that link). Call markets have the interesting property of higher liquidity and lower short-term volatility relative to a CDA. When you realize CDAs are a sequential operation, and call markets are batch, it&#8217-s easy to see why this is true. In a batch operation, buy and sell orders are likely to offset, keeping price movement to a minimum vs. a bunch of sequential order fills alternating at the bid/ask. The advantage shifts towards price-takers, resulting in more trading and better price discovery, in my opinion. It&#8217-s not hard to see that a call auction where everyone&#8217-s offer was secret (and treated equally) would eliminate many of the shenanigans of CDAs. The following was said of call auction markets:

“Recent advances in computer technology have considerably expanded the call auction&#8217-s functionality. We suggest that the problems we are facing concerning liquidity, volatility, fragmentation and price discovery are largely endemic to the continuous market, and that the introduction of electronic call auction trading in the U.S. would be the most important innovation in market structure that could be made.”

That was said over 10 years ago, and it&#8217-s not hard to see why call markets are attractive, so why aren&#8217-t they taking over? Aside from call market proponent&#8217-s conspiracy theories that the bad boys of Wall Street would lose out, there is the major problem of immediacy. You just don&#8217-t trade a call market whenever you want to. The now defunct Arizona Stock Exchange was a call market that cleared once a day, for example. While some might argue that clearing once a day is a more productive use of people&#8217-s time, so long as some other market is clearing the same securities continuously, trading will flow to the other market, because there are simply more opportunities there.

Hanson&#8217-s Combinatorial Market. I&#8217-ve been fascinated by Hanson&#8217-s combinatorial market, although I must admit I don&#8217-t fully understand all of it&#8217-s intricacies. This market doesn&#8217-t use a limit order book at all (unless you want to use one because you want it to scale well), liquidity is always present via a market maker, and there is no bid-ask spread, because the price you pay is a continuous function of how much you want to buy or sell. The less the amount, the less your price will diverge from the last trade price. In the absence of other friction, the smallest trades are possible, even efficient, because liquidity is continuous (via a market maker that has a continuous price function). What&#8217-s more, you can have a functioning market with just a few traders, unlike a CDA. Hanson&#8217-s market is designed to function well in thin markets. Unfortunately, all of these characteristics are provided by one market maker adapted more for event markets than securities markets. This market maker decides what the price will be rather than the market players themselves. Furthermore, the market maker can be set up with different behaviors (scoring rules) and is subject to losing money (although the bounds of the loss is known ahead of time). While Hanson&#8217-s market maker may be an ideal way to subsidize liquidity in a fledgling prediction market, it doesn&#8217-t appear to me to be adaptable to a securities market.

The ideal market. An ideal dark market for CASTrader would be one that operated continuously, scaled well, and is general purpose like a CDA, while having the efficiency, volatility and trade encouraging characteristics of a call market, combined with the continuous liquidity and ability to function in thin markets of Hanson&#8217-s combinatorial market. To boot, I&#8217-d like it to be fair to traders of all sizes, as well as easy to program relative to a CDA. Is that possible? See Part III, over at CASTrader.

Recession probability index rises to 16.9%

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The Bureau of Economic Analysis reported today that U.S. real GDP grew at an annual rate of 1.3% in the first quarter of 2007, moving our recession probability index up to 16.9%. This post provides some background on how that index is constructed and what the latest move up might signify.

What sort of GDP growth do we typically see during a recession? It is easy enough to answer this question just by selecting those postwar quarters that the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) has determined were characterized by economic recession and summarizing the probability distribution of those quarters. A plot of this density, estimated using nonparametric kernel methods, is provided in the following figure- (figures here are similar to those in a paper I wrote with UC Riverside Professor Marcelle Chauvet, which appeared last year in Nonlinear Time Series Analysis of Business Cycles). The horizontal axis on this figure corresponds to a possible rate of GDP growth (quoted at an annual rate) for a given quarter, while the height of the curve on the vertical axis corresponds to the probability of observing GDP growth of that magnitude when the economy is in a recession. You can see from the graph that the quarters in which the NBER says that the U.S. was in a recession are often, though far from always, characterized by negative real GDP growth. Of the 45 quarters in which the NBER says the U.S. was in recession, 19 were actually characterized by at least some growth of real GDP.

chauvet3.gif

One can also calculate, as in the blue curve below, the corresponding characterization of expansion quarters. Again, these usually show positive GDP growth, though 10 of the postwar quarters that are characterized by NBER as part of an expansion exhibited negative real GDP growth.

chauvet4.gif

The observed data on GDP growth can be thought of as a mixture of these two distributions. Historically, about 20% of the postwar U.S. quarters are characterized as recession and 80% as expansion. If one multiplies the recession density in the first figure by 0.2, one arrives at the red curve in the figure below. Multiplying the expansion density (second figure above) by 0.8, one arrives at the blue curve in the figure below. If the two products (red and blue curves) are added together, the result is the overall density for GDP growth coming from the combined contribution of expansion and recession observations. This mixture is represented by the yellow curve in the figure below.

chauvet5.gif

It is clear that if in a particular quarter one observes a very low value of GDP growth such as -6%, that suggests very strongly that the economy was in recession that quarter, because for such a value of GDP growth, the recession distribution (red curve)is the most important part of the mixture distribution (yellow curve). Likewise, a very high value such as +6% almost surely came from the contribution of expansions to the distribution. Intuitively, one would think that the ratio of the height of the recession contribution (the red curve) to the height of the mixture distribution (the yellow curve) corresponds to the probability that a quarter with that value of GDP growth would have been characterized by the NBER as being in a recession. Actually, this is not just intuitively sensible, it in fact turns out to be an exact application of Bayes&#8217- Law. The height of the red curve measures the joint probability of observing GDP growth of a certain magnitude and the occurrence of a recession, whereas the height of the yellow curve measures the unconditional probability of observing the indicated level of GDP growth. The ratio between the two is therefore the conditional probability of a recession given an observed value of GDP growth. This ratio is plotted as the red curve in the figure below.

chauvet6.gif

Such an inference strategy seems quite reasonable and robust, but unfortunately it is not particularly useful&#8211- for most of the values one would be interested in, the implication from Bayes&#8217- Law is that it&#8217-s hard to say from just one quarter&#8217-s value for GDP growth what is going on. However, there is a second feature of recessions that is extremely useful to exploit&#8211- if the economy was in an expansion last quarter, there is a 95% chance it will continue to be in expansion this quarter, whereas if it was in a recession last quarter, there is a 75% chance the recession will persist this quarter. Thus suppose for example that we had observed -10% GDP growth last quarter, which would have convinced us that the economy was almost surely in a recession last quarter. Before we saw this quarter&#8217-s GDP number, we would have thought in that case that there&#8217-s a 0.75 probability of the recession continuing into the current quarter. In this situation, to use Bayes&#8217- Law to form an inference about the current quarter given both the current and previous quarters&#8217- GDP, we would weight the mixtures not by 0.2 and 0.8 (the unconditional probabilities of this quarter being in recession and expansion, respectively), but rather by magnitudes closer to 0.75 and 0.25 (the probabilities of being in recession this period conditional on being in recession the previous period). The ratio of the height of the resulting new red curve to the resulting new yellow curve could then be used to calculate the conditional probability of a recession in quarter t based on observations of the values of GDP for both quarters t and t – 1. Starting from a position of complete ignorance at the start of the sample, we could apply this method sequentially to each observation to form a guess about whether the economy was in a recession at each date given not just that quarter&#8217-s GDP growth, but all the data observed up to that point.

Once can also use the same principle, which again is nothing more than Bayes&#8217- Law, working backwards in time&#8211- if this quarter we see GDP growth of -6%, that means we&#8217-re very likely in a recession this quarter, and given the persistence of recessions, that raises the likelihood that a recession actually began the period before. The farther back one looks in time, the better inference one can arrive at. Seeing this quarter&#8217-s GDP numbers helps me make a much better guess about whether the economy might have been in recession the previous quarter. We then work through the data iteratively in both directions&#8211- start with a state of complete ignorance about the sample, work through each date to form an inference about the current quarter given all the data up to that date, and then use the final value to work backwards to form an inference about each quarter based on GDP for the entire sample.

All this has been described here as if we took the properties of recessions and expansions as determined by the NBER as given. However, another thing one can do with this approach is to calculate the probability law for observed GDP growth itself, not conditioning at all on the NBER dates. Once we&#8217-ve done that calculation, we could infer the parameters such as how long recessions usually last and how severe they are in terms of GDP growth directly from GDP data alone, using the principle of maximum likelihood estimation. It is interesting that when we do this, we arrive at estimates of the parameters that are in fact very similar to the ones obtained using the NBER dates directly.

What&#8217-s the point of this, if all we do is use GDP to deduce what the NBER is eventually going to tell us anyway? The issue is that the NBER typically does not make its announcements until long after the fact. For example, the most recent release from the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee was announced to the public in July 2003. Unfortunately, what the NBER announced in July 2003 was that the recession had actually ended in November 2001&#8211- they are telling us the situation 1-1/2 years after it has happened.

Waiting so long to make an announcement certainly has some benefits, allowing time for data to be revised and accumulating enough ex-post data to make the inference sufficiently accurate. However, my research with the algorithm sketched above suggests that it really performs quite satisfactorily if we just wait for one quarter&#8217-s worth of additional data. Thus, for example, with the advance 2007:Q1 GDP data just released, we form an inference about whether a recession might have started in 2006:Q4. The graph below shows how well this one-quarter-delayed inference would have performed historically. Shaded areas denote the dates of NBER recessions, which were not used in any way in constructing the index. Note moreover that this series is entirely real-time in construction&#8211- the value for any date is always based solely on information as it was reported in the advance GDP estimates available one quarter after the indicated date.

rec_prob_midas.gif

Although the sluggish GDP growth rates of the past year have produced quite an obvious move up the recession probability index, it is still far from the point at which we would conclude that a recession has likely started. At Econbrowser we will be following the procedure recommended in the research paper mentioned above&#8211- we will not declare that a recession has begun until the probability rises above 2/3. Once it begins, we will not declare it over until the probability falls back below 1/3.

So yes, the ongoing sluggish GDP growth has come to a point where we would worry about it, but no, it&#8217-s not at the point yet where we would say that a recession has likely begun.

[James Hamilton is professor of economics at the University of California, San Diego. The above is cross-posted from Econbrowser].

BetFair vs. TradeSports-InTrade

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&#8220-Anonymous&#8221- to Patri Friedman (thanks to Jason Ruspini for the link):

Have you tried Betfair? www.betfair.com . Chris Masse over at Midas Oracle www.midasoracle.com &#8212- the main prediction markets blog &#8212- tends to support them over InTrade. The interface is not as nice as InTrade&#8217-s though (they give punter odds rather than decimal probability prices).

#1. BetFair won&#8217-t let any U.S. resident opens an account, because BetFair has decided to abide by US laws. (See: &#8220-We wish to reiterate our well documented and long-standing policy of not accepting US customers, funds, or bets.&#8220-) That said, some US residents have managed to open BetFair accounts via the complicity of British friends. As you all know, TradeSports-Intrade was created and became successful on two premises: number one, BetFair won&#8217-t enter the US market until it is legal, and, number two, US-based prediction exchanges (betting exchanges, event futures exchanges other than hedging-oriented) are not legally allowed to perform operations. Thus, the situation we have today: TradeSports-Intrade is the de facto monopoly in the US market of unregulated event derivatives. (MatchBook is trying to pierce with a marketing strategy a la TradeBetX. And, of course, online sportsbooks are TradeSports-Intrade&#8217-s competitors.)

#2. There are many real-money prediction exchanges (betting exchange, event futures exchanges). To trade or to get probabilities, you should select the one that has the most volume on the (regulated or unregulated) event derivative you&#8217-re interested in. For US politics, it&#8217-s TradeSports-InTrade. For British and Irish politics, it&#8217-s BetFair.

#3. BetFair is indeed a formidable operator &#8212-big, powerful, ethical, with a fantastic technical team, and a robust and sophisticated software. Very long term, BetFair is going to take over Trade-Sports-InTrade in the US.

#4. The prices (which the economists allow us to interpret as probabilities, when these prices come from prediction exchanges, as opposed to bookmakers) can be expressed in four ways: 0&#8211-100, American, fractional or decimal. It&#8217-s all equivalent. For instance, you take the number &#8220-1&#8243-, you divide it by the BetFair&#8217-s &#8220-last price matched&#8221- expressed as&#8221-decimal odds&#8221-, you multiply it by &#8220-100&#8243-, and you get your 0&#8211-100 price/probability.

BetFair: Republican Nicolas Sarkozy as next French President

Total matched on this event: $728,806
Betting summary – Volume: $463,083
Last price matched: 1.32 [“1” divided by “1.32” and multiplied by “100” = 75.8%]

BetFair explainer on decimal odds:

What are Decimal Odds?
All prices quoted on Betfair are &#8216-Decimal&#8217- Odds. Decimal Odds differ from the Odds traditionally quoted in the UK in that they include your stake as part of your total return. If you place a bet of ?10 at Decimal Odds of 4.0 and win, then your total return (including stake) is ?40. In the UK this would be quoted as 3/1, returning to you winnings of ?30 plus your original stake of ?10.
Decimal Odds are simpler to use than Traditional Odds, and are the most common form of Odds quoted in countries outside the UK. In addition, for the mathematically minded, Decimal Odds relate more closely to probability: in a race with four equally-matched horses, the probability of each horse winning is 25%. Each horse will have Traditional Odds of 3/1 or Decimal Odds of 4.0. Hence, the probability of an outcome equals 1 divided by its Decimal Odds (1 / 4.0 = 25%).
Decimal Odds also offer many more prices – Betfair offer every price between 1.01 and 2.0 to two decimal places. With no margins to protect, our customers deserve to see every price available.

#5. Any software for prediction markets (and betting exchanges) should be able to convert the prices in these four different formats &#8212-on top of being translated in many foreign languages.

#6. British consultant wannabe Jed Christiansen, freshly minted &#8220-from the London School of Economics&#8221-, has a new blog post out (he blogs on a monthly basis) on BetFair versus TradeSports-InTrade (BetFair being &#8220-betting&#8221-, and InTrade-TradeSports being &#8220-financial&#8221-), which is the most ridiculous statement I have ever read since Paris Hilton declared to the world that she was going to morph herself into a &#8220-savvy business titan&#8221-.

– Jed Christiansen tries to divine the &#8220-psychological approach&#8221- of BetFair and TradeSports-InTrade. Oh, mon Dieu!&#8230- Jed Christiansen&#8217-s thinking is rotten from the start. Just like the beauty is in the eye of the beholder, the marketing &#8220-approach&#8221- is conditional to its adoption by the customers/consumers. Any popular products (here, event derivatives, prediction markets) belong to its customers/consumers (here, the traders and the info consumers), and then the &#8220-approach&#8221- is to listen to the improvement they suggest to the service. Any incremental innovation of your prediction market software is just the anticipation of future traders&#8217- needs. Event derivative traders on both sides of the Atlantic have the same needs. The traders are in the driver&#8217-s seat. If they are satisfied, they patronize and come en masse (no pun intended), and if they are not, they leave. Traders don&#8217-t give the first fig about the &#8220-psychological approach&#8221- of the prediction exchanges. You can&#8217-t spin the British and Irish traders one way, and the American and Canadian traders another way. Trader&#8217-s needs are imperial and universal. It&#8217-s the traders who shape the prediction exchanges (betting exchanges) their way.

Jed Christiansen makes a big fuss out of tiny differences between BetFair and TradeSports-InTrade. For instance, BetFair outputs prices as &#8220-decimal odds&#8221-, and, of course, the Grand Inquisitor views it as a sign from God that BetFair is &#8220-betting&#8221-. But that&#8217-s bullshit, as the readers of Midas Oracle all know. With a simple computation, you can transform the &#8220-decimal odds&#8221- into 0&#8211-100 prices. (You take the number &#8220-1&#8243-, you divide it by the BetFair&#8217-s &#8220-last price matched&#8221- expressed as&#8221-decimal odds&#8221-, you multiply it by &#8220-100&#8243-, and you get your 0&#8211-100 price/probability.)

– BetFair uses the words &#8220-back&#8221- and &#8220-lay&#8221- (instead of &#8220-bid&#8221- and &#8220-ask&#8221-) and the Grand Inquisitor views it as yet another sign from God that BetFair is &#8220-betting&#8221- (as opposed to &#8220-financial&#8221-).

– Jed Christiansen states that the &#8220-psychological approach&#8221- of BetFair (being &#8220-betting&#8221-) is dictated by the fact that its competitors are the British bookies (and the online bookmakers, I will add). The main competitors of InTrade-TradeSports are the US illegal bookmakers and the offshore sportsbooks. BetFair and InTrade-TradeSports both have the same kind of competitors, the fixed-odds bookmakers. (Being illegal in America, InTrade-TradeSports can&#8217-t market to the sophisticated US horse race bettors.)

Jed Christiansen has opted for religion over theory. He religiously believes that BetFair is &#8220-betting&#8221- and InTrade-TradeSports is &#8220-financial&#8221-, and he will take any insignificant piece of evidence to make his case.

&#8212-

External Link: Nisan Gabbay on BetFair

Previous: BetFair Case Study – Betting Exchange – Prediction Markets

[…] Betfair on the other hand was built like a stock market exchange, where odds functioned as the share prices. […]

UPDATE: Yahoo! research scientist David Pennock comments&#8230-

I think Jed Christiansen is correct to a large degree. Betfair speaks the punter’s (gambler’s) language. TradeSports speaks Wall Street’s language. I have a bookie friend who upon first look at TradeSports couldn’t make heads or tails of it. Chris is right in that both betfair and TradeSports perform the same service. However their target audience, at least initially, is different.

NEXT: User Interface &amp- Target Audience: BetFair, TradeSports-InTrade, MatchBook, etc.

UPDATE: Jed Christiansen&#8230-

That was the point I was trying to make. In the end, both types of sites accomplish the exact same thing- an event futures market. But I was pointing out the differences in how the sites work that come from their positioning in the marketplace.

In my perfect world, a trader could choose how they interacted with an exchange. They could choose a basic interaction, or a user interface with lots of options. They could choose to see contracts in decimal odds or percentages, etc. It’s not as easy as it sounds, which is why we probably haven’t seen it yet.

UPDATE: David Stalcup&#8230-

In fact you can see odds listed decimal, 0–100 prices or moneyline format (-110) at TradesSorts. You just make that choice at TradeBetX with your TradeSports login info. You have the option of viewing odds in any format. TradeBetX/TradeSports are the same company, just different branding and options at TradeBetX.