The GOP SC and Dem NV Showdown: Intrade v. Zogby

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If McCain wins SC, the GOP contest will be called for Intrade. If Thompson or Romney wins, that contest will be called for Zogby. If any other GOP candidate wins, the contest will end in a draw.

If Obama wins NV, the Dem context will be called for Intrade. If Edwards wins, that contest will be called for Zogby. If H.Clinton or another candidate wins, the contest will end in a draw.

Zogby does not have recent information posted about the GOP in NV nor the Dems in SC, so a meaningful contest with Intrade cannot be had. While it&#8217-s not a forfeiture by Zogby, at least it&#8217-s a tiebreaker for Intrade.

Election eve candidate probabilities posted at Caveat Bettor.

ROBIN HANSON TELLS THE TRUTH ON GOOGLES ENTERPRISE PREDICTION MARKETS.

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Robin Hanson:

Yes prediction markets are cool, Google is cool, and it is cool that Google had location data to show how location influences trading. But cool need not be useful. People are not asking the hard questions here: what value exactly is Google getting out of these markets, aside from helping them look cool?

Robin Hanson is a modern-day hero. Speaks the truth. Has a clear vision. Doesn&#8217-t mind to act as a contrarian, now and then. Like Winston Churchill. Is a real leader.

Related Links: Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence From Google – (PDF file – PDF file) – by Bo Cowgill (Google economic analyst), Justin Wolfers (University of Pennsylvania) and Eric Zitzewitz (Dartmouth College)

Robin Hanson is not convinced by the Google experiment with enterprise prediction markets -to say the least.

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Robin Hanson in a comment on Marginal Revolution:

This is important work for organizational sociology, but not for prediction markets, as this does little to help us find and field high value markets.

Finally, somebody who speaks the truth.

See also the comment of economist Michael Giberson.

Related Links: Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence From Google – (PDF file – PDF file) – by Bo Cowgill (Google economic analyst), Justin Wolfers (University of Pennsylvania) and Eric Zitzewitz (Dartmouth College)

Why collecting and synthesizing the dispersed available information?

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Sean Park (after a long, boring introduction to the subject):

[…] The ‘failure’ of New Hampshire was the result of primarily two factors:

  1. It wasn’t a failure. No market is always right. More importantly markets reflect the information available to and the interests of their participants. Basically markets are very efficient mechanisms (I would claim the most efficient) for processing information. No more, no less.
  2. In this particular instance, the probability of the market producing an erroneous forecast was high due to the lack of liquidity. This is a problem of all political markets in the US. Show me a market on the New Hampshire primaries with tens of thousands of participants and millions of dollars traded and I will show you a market that creates more valuable information. BUT it would still on occasion be ’surprised.’

Basically I guess what I’m trying to say is the expectations seem to be set all wrong by many inside the community. I think “prediction markets” – creating markets in information and outcomes is a wonderfully important and valuable thing to do. Equally however I think that anyone that represents such markets as being able to predict the future is a charlatan. What they can do is collect and synthesize powerfully and efficiently all the dispersed available information – using money as the relevance filter. This is very valuable in its own right and is defensible. Promoting prediction markets to true sceptics (ie mainstream American politicians) on the basis that they are a Delphic Oracle is surely a path to certain tears and ultimately is almost guaranteed to fail. [*]

Markets don’t compute unknown unknowns. That doesn’t mean they are useless, just that they have to be understood in context.

[*] How to promote the prediction markets, then? As information collecting tools? Who should use these tools, then? Experts or ignorants? Sean Park does not elaborate further. None of the questions I have asked are answered.

Have Googles enterprise prediction markets been accurate?

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Justin Wolfers:

So we decided to move beyond asking, “Do prediction markets work?” and instead use them as a tool for better understanding how information flows within a (very cool) corporation.

I am more interested in the accuracy of the enterprise prediction markets than in corporate micro-geography issues.

Related Links: Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence From Google – (PDF file – PDF file) – by Bo Cowgill (Google economic analyst), Justin Wolfers (University of Pennsylvania) and Eric Zitzewitz (Dartmouth College)

InTrade is no psychic -but what if that bit of truth is systematically said BEFORE, as opposed to AFTER.

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David Leonhart in his New York Times blog, last week:

The political prediction markets just went through their version of the dot-com bubble. […]

Intrade’s odds have had a very good forecasting record over the last few years, having correctly called every Senate race in 2006, every state in the 2004 presidential election and all but one state in the 2004 Senate races. The odds also correctly called New Hampshire for John McCain this week and now make him the favorite for the Republican nomination- he is given a 38 percent chance, while Rudolph W. Giuliani is given a 29 percent chance.

Intrade’s executives, as well as the academic researchers who study the site, are careful to point out that its contracts provide only odds, not certainties. An outcome that’s given a 20 percent chance of happening should happen 20 percent of the time — not never. […]

The question I asked yesterday was: What would happen if that warning label were to be sticked on InTrade before each election, as opposed to after each predictive debacle? My bet is that, if you suppress the mention of InTrade&#8217-s magical touch, the Irish real-money prediction markets will be far less appealing to people. They want magic. All of the sudden, InTrade is not a psychic anymore, but simply a forecasting tool of convenience for busy people who don&#8217-t want to check the polls in details. This issue is crucial if we want to be able to define what is the &#8220-prediction market approach&#8221- &#8212-as opposed to the &#8220-betting exchange approach&#8221-.

Give me one reason why the political analysts should follow the US primaries thru the prism of the InTrade prediction markets instead of thru the polls. [My question is still unanswered, you will notice. Which shows to you the embarrassment of the prediction market luminaries (or so they think they are).]

Once the true nature of the prediction markets appears more clearly, it becomes evident that they are not tools for the experts, but tools for the ignorants, rather. Which is great, provided that this is said clearly from the start.

Prediction Market Efficiency vs. Prediction Market Accuracy

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Panos Ipeirotis in a comment here:

[W]e should try to separate two things: Market efficiency and market accuracy. Efficiency is the rate in which the market incorporates new information and prevents any arbitrage opportunities. Accuracy is the probability in which the market predicts the correct outcome of an event. The main claim to fame for the [prediction] markets is that they self-report their accuracy, and that “the prices are probabilities”.

We can measure the effectiveness of the market by following the outline discussed above. One axis is the price of the contract at time t before the expiration of the contract and the other axis is the rate in which this event happens. (…60% of the cases the event that trades at 0.6 happens, 30% of the cases the event that trades at 0.3 happens, and so on…). A perfectly accurate market should have a straight line as an outcome when time t gets close to 0. Any deviation of the experimental results indicates an accuracy bias. There are many papers that indicate the favorite-longshot biases in the market (underprice the favorite, overprice the longshots) so there is no need to really repeat this here. An interesting thing is to see how big it can be and still have reasonable accuracy. Furthermore, if we have systematic and robust biases, then we can use a calibration function that will adjust the market prices, compensating for the biases, to reflect real-life probabilities.

Measuring efficiency is a trickier concept. The general definition of efficiency is that “the market immediately incorporates all available information”. Being able to predict price movements indicates inefficiency. Having prices for an event summing up to anything other than 1, indicates inefficiency. However, it is difficult to have a definite proof that the market is efficient. We can only say that “we were not able to spot inefficiencies”. It is very difficult to prove that “the market is efficient”.

The two metrics are, of course, highly connected close to the expiration of the contract. If the market is not efficient, then it will not be accurate, as it will not have had incorporated all the available information, if any material information becomes available just before the expiration of the contract.

Panos Ipeirotis

Defining Probability in Prediction Markets

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The New Hampshire Democratic primary was one of the few(?) events in which prediction markets did not give an &#8220-accurate&#8221- forecast for the winner. In a typical &#8220-accurate&#8221- prediction, the candidate that has the contract with the highest price ends up winning the election.

This result, combined with an increasing interest/hype about the predictive accuracy of prediction markets, generated a huge backslash. Many opponents of prediction markets pointed out the &#8220-failure&#8221- and started questioning the overall concept and the ability of prediction markets to aggregate information.

Interestingly enough, such failed predictions are absolutely necessary if we want to take the concept of prediction markets seriously. If the frontrunner in a prediction market was always the winner, then the markets would have been a seriously flawed mechanism. In such a case, an obvious trading strategy would be to buy the frontrunner&#8217-s contract and then simply wait for the market to expire to get a guaranteed, huge profit. If for example Obama was trading at 66 cents and Clinton at 33 cents (indicating that Obama is twice as likely to be the winner), and the markets were &#8220-always accurate&#8221- then it would make sense to buy Obama&#8217-s contract the day before the election and get $1 back the next day. If this was happening every time, then this would not be an efficient market. This would be a flawed, inefficient market.

In fact, I would like to argue that the late streak of successes of the markets to always pick the winner of the elections lately has been an anomaly, indicating the favorite bias that exists in these markets. The markets were more accurate than they should, according to the trading prices. If the market never fails then the prices do not reflect reality, and the favorite is actually underpriced.

The other point that has been raised in many discussions (mainly from a mainstream audience) is how we can even define probability for an one-time event like the Democratic nomination for the 2008 presidential election. What it means that Clinton has 60% probability of being the nominee and Obama has 40% probability? The common answer is that &#8220-if we repeat the event for many times, 60% of the cases Clinton will be the nominee and 40% of the cases, it will be Obama&#8221-. Even though this is an acceptable answer for someone used to work with probabilities, it makes very little sense for the &#8220-average Joe&#8221- who wants to understand how these markets work. The notion of repeating the nomination process multiple times is an absurd concept.

The discussion brings in mind the ferocious battles between Frequentists and Bayesians for the definition of probability. Bayesians could not accept that we can use a Frequentist approach for defining probabilities for events. &#8220-How can we define the probability of success for an one-time event?&#8221- The Frequentist would approach the prediction market problem by defining a space of events and would say:

After examining prediction markets for many state-level primaries, we observed that 60% of the cases the frontrunners who had a contract priced at 0.60 one day before the election, were actually the winners of the election. In 30% of the cases, the candidates who had a contract priced at 0.30 one day before the election, were actually the winners of the election, and so on.

A Bayesian would criticize such an approach, especially when the sample size of measurement is small, and would point to the need to have an initial belief function, that should be updated as information signals come from the market. Interestingly enough, the two approaches tend to be equivalent in the presence of infinite samples, which is however rarely the case.

Crossposted from my blog

Can the prediction markets survive without the over-selling from John Delaney and his little fanboys?

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Emile Servan-Schreiber:

[…] The classic first line of defense in these cases is to remind people that market “predictions” are really just probabilities, so any one outcome cannot invalidate the approach. The argument is sound and backed up by loads of data. But it would of course be much more convincing if we, as an industry, would remember to show at least as much humility when our market “predictions” appear correct instead. If you’re going to spread the idea that your market called all 50 states in the last U.S. presidential election because each correct outcome was predicted with over 50% chance, then you can’t hide behind probabilities when an 80% prediction comes to naught, as in Obama’s NH collapse. […]

Emile Servan-Schreiber makes a good point &#8212-see also Panos Ipeirotis, in the same vein.

But the over-selling is the reason [*] why InTrade (and not NewsFutures) has managed to infiltrate so many US media. If you suppress the magical touch, then InTrade is just a forecasting tool of convenience &#8212-for those too busy to look at the polls.

Give me one reason why the political analysts should follow InTrade instead of the polls, then?

What is the true nature of the prediction markets? How to use the prediction markets? Who should use the prediction markets? For what benefits? Once you have the answer to these 4 questions, you can tackle the next two problematics: How to market the prediction markets without over-selling them. How to report news thru the prism of the prediction markets while respecting their true probabilistic nature.

Welcome to the version #2 of the prediction market industry. Quite a horse of another color, now.

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[*] UPDATE: The over-selling aspect is the topping over the real-money and the liquidity dimensions. The over-selling aspect wraps all that.

Prediction Markets 101

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Prediction markets produce dynamic, objective probabilistic predictions on the outcomes of future events by aggregating disparate pieces of information that traders bring when they agree on prices. Prediction markets are meta forecasting tools that feed on advanced indicators (like polls and surveys). Garbage in, garbage out&#8230- Intelligence in, intelligence out&#8230-

A prediction market is a market for a contract that yields payments based on the outcome of a partially uncertain future event, such as an election. A contract pays $100 only if candidate X wins the election, and $0 otherwise. When the market price of an X contract is $60, the prediction market believes that candidate X has a 60% chance of winning the election. The price of this event derivative can be interpreted as the objective probability of the future outcome (i.e., its most statistically accurate forecast). A 60% probability means that, in a series of events each with a 60% probability, then 60 times out of 100, the favored outcome will occur- and 40 times out of 100, the unfavored outcome will occur.

Each prediction exchange organizes its own set of real-money and/or play-money markets, using either a CDA or a MSR mechanism.

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Any comment, Michael Giberson? :-D

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Credits given to:

– Chris Masse-.

– Justin Wolfers.

Robin Hanson.

– Jason Ruspini.

– Caveat Bettor.

– John Tierney.

Jonathan Kennedy.

– Mike Giberson.

– Eric Zitzewitz.

– Cass Sunstein.

– Steve Roman,

– Nigel Eccles.

– The Everyday Economist.

– Adam Siegel.

George Tziralis.

– Leighton Vaughan-Williams.

– Emile Servan-Schreiber.

– &#8220-Thrutch&#8220-.

Panos Ipeirotis.