Where to find advice on how to set up your enterprise prediction markets

No Gravatar

Consultants

Inkling – URL: Inkling Markets – (Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.)

  • Adam Siegel — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
  • Nathan Kontny

Consensus Point – (Nashville, Tennessee, U.S.A. &amp- Calgary, Alberta, Canada)

  • David Perry — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
  • Ken Kittlitz, who co-founded the Foresight Exchange in 1994. — Post Archives at Midas Oracle

NewsFutures – (Maryland, U.S.A. &amp- Paris, France, E.U.)

  • Emile Servan-Schreiber — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
  • Maurice Balick

Xpree – (U.S.A.)

  • Mat Fogarty — Post Archives at Midas Oracle

HP Services – HP Labs – (U.S.A.)

  • Predicting the future &#8211-with games — Introductory article
  • Information Dynamics Lab — Internal prediction markets
  • BRAIN – (Behaviorallly Robust Aggregation of Information in Networks) — Scoring Rules (i.e., non-trading technique)
  • Bernardo A. Huberman – Bernardo Huberman – Senior Fellow &amp- Director
  • Kay-Yut Chen –
  • Google Search for &#8220-prediction markets&#8221-

Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSX) &amp- HSX Research – (L.A., California, U.S.A.)

  • Prediction market consultancy firm
  • Movie business

Chris Hibbert – (California, U.S.A.)

  • Chris Hibbert (Software architect / Zocalo project manager) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
  • Chris Hibbert&#8217-s personal website — Chris Hibbert&#8217-s personal blog —
  • Chris Hibbert&#8217-s CommerceNet profile — (His stint there ended in mid-2006.)

Robin Hanson – (George Mason U., Virginia, U.S.A.)

  • Robin Hanson — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
  • Robin Hanson does prediction market consulting work, and have no exclusive arrangements.
  • &#8220-I&#8217-m more interested in helping groups that want to add lots of value to big decisions, versus groups that just want to dabble in a new fad.&#8221-

Justin Wolfers – (U. of Pennsylvania&#8217-s Wharton business school, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.)

  • Justin Wolfers — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
  • Justin Wolfers takes on prediction market consulting work.
  • The prediction market industry is &#8220-a case where the interaction between firm practice and academic research are reasonably close.&#8221-

Koleman Strumpf – (U. of Kansas, Kansas, U.S.A.)

  • Koleman Strumpf — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
  • Koleman Strumpf can be approached to consult on prediction market projects.
  • &#8220-Prediction markets help harness the knowledge of diverse groups. They have great potential as a tool for industry.&#8221-

Michael Giberson – (Virginia, U.S.A.)

  • Michael Giberson (energy economist, who is also an expert in prediction markets) — Post archives at Midas Oracle
  • Knowledge Problem – Blog on economics, energy policy, more.

Robert Hahn – (American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.)

  • Robert Hahn — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
  • Robert Hahn does consulting focused on improving decision making in the private and public sector. &#8220-This work builds on our evolving understanding of prediction markets and other economic tools.&#8221-

IntelliMarket Systems – (L.A., California, U.S.A.)

  • Charles R. Plott – Charles Plott – (CalTech Inst., California, U.S.A.)

Mercury Research and Consulting – (United Kingdom, E.U.)

  • Jed Christiansen — Post Archives at Midas Oracle

Ask Markets – (Greece, E.U.)

  • George Tziralis — Post Archives at Midas Oracle

Gexid – Global Exchange for Information Derivatives – (Germany, E.U.)

  • Bernd Ankenbrand — Post Archives at Midas Oracle

Nosco – (Danemark, E.U.)

  • Jesper Krogstrup — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
  • Oliver Bernhard Pedersen

Qmarkets – (Israel)

  • Noam Danon — Post Archives at Midas Oracle

ProKons – (Germany)

  • Peter Gollowitsch

Hive Insight – (Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina, U.S.A. &amp- London, U.K., E.U.)

  • Robert Wilburn (ex-NewsFutures)

Foresight Markets – (??)

  • BPH Technologies

NimaniX – (Israel)

  • Elad Amir (CEO), Littal Shemer Haim (VP Business development), David Shahar (VP R&amp-D)

PrediCom – (London, United Kingdom, E.U.)

  • Mikael Edholm

Previous blog posts by Chris F. Masse:

  • This is why I said that those who believe that Hillary Clinton has a chance to be on the Democratic ticket are “clueless”.
  • WEB EXCLUSIVE: — The annoted, historical, compound chart that those triple morons at the BetFair blog are hiding from their readers’ view. — It is located in a secret cache, linked to behind a picture of Hillary Clinton. — Curious place to locate a prediction market chart. — I bet nobody downloaded that chart. —
  • Knows the similarity between Google, Craig’s List, and the Drudge Report?
  • “Listening to each other is core to our culture, and we don’t listen to each other just because we’re all so smart. We listen because everyone has good ideas, and because it’s a great way to show respect. And any company, at any point in its history, can start listening more.”
  • 2 days after my ringing the alarm bell… THE FREE FALL
  • Tech News Of The Day — Friday Morning Edition
  • VIDEO: Why Hillary Clinton will never be the Vice President of the United States of America.

Excellent article about enterprise prediction markets and Inkling Markets -with a good word for Robin Hanson, who invented MSR.

No Gravatar

Via Daniel Horowitz (Business and Technology Consultant)

Software taps into the zeitgeist to predict the future.

Previous blog posts by Chris F. Masse:

  • No Trades (other than at the start) —-> Not a reliable predictor, as of today
  • How you should read Midas Oracle
  • The best prediction exchanges
  • “There will be no media consumption left in ten years that is not delivered over an IP network. There will be no newspapers, no magazines that are delivered in paper form. Everything gets delivered in an electronic form.”
  • Hillary Clinton won’t be on the Democratic ticket. — It’s not going to happen. — N-E-V-E-R. — Not a chance. — Period.
  • Suggestion for WordPress — Subscribers’ Capabilities
  • This is why I said that those who believe that Hillary Clinton has a chance to be on the Democratic ticket are “clueless”.

Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence from Google – VIDEO – Bo Cowgill on Googles enterprise prediction markets – OReilly Money:Tech

No Gravatar

Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence from Google – (PDF file – PDF file) – by Bo Cowgill, Justin Wolfers, and Eric Zitwewitz – 2008-01-06

Via Daniel Horowitz (Business and Technology Consultant)

Blip.TV &#8212- (FLV file)

It&#8217-s cool. :-D

Google Web Search

Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence from Google – (PDF file – PDF file) – by Bo Cowgill, Justin Wolfers, and Eric Zitwewitz – 2008-01-06

ABSTRACT: In the last 2.5 years, Google has conducted the largest corporate experiment with prediction markets we are aware of. In this paper, we illustrate how markets can be used to study how an organization processes information. We document a number of biases in Google’s markets, most notably an optimistic bias. Newly hired employees are on the optimistic side of these markets, and optimistic biases are significantly more pronounced on days when Google stock is appreciating. We find strong correlations in trading for those who sit within a few feet of one another- social networks and work relationships also play a secondary explanatory role. The results are interesting in light of recent research on the role of optimism in entrepreneurial firms, as well as recent work on the importance of geographical and social proximity in explaining information flows in firms and markets.

DISCUSSION: In the past few years, many companies have experimented with prediction markets. In this paper, we analyze the largest such experiment we are aware of. We find that prices in Google’s markets closely approximated event probabilities, but did contain some biases, especially early in our sample. The most interesting of these was an optimism bias, which was more pronounced for subjects under the control of Google employees, such as would a project be completed on time or would a particular office be opened. Optimism was more present in the trading of newly hired employees, and was significantly more pronounced on and immediately following days with Google stock price appreciation. Our optimism results are interesting given the role that optimism is often thought to play in motivation and the success of entrepreneurial firms. They raise the possibility of a “stock price-optimism-performance-stock price” feedback that may be worthy of further investigation. We also examine how information and beliefs about prediction market topics move around an organization. We find a significant role for micro-geography. The trading of physically proximate employees is correlated, and only becomes correlated after the employees begin to sit near each other, suggesting a causal relationship. Work and social connections play a detectable but significantly smaller role.

An important caveat to our results is that they tell us about information flows about prediction market subjects, many of which are ancillary to employees’ main jobs. This may explain why physical proximity matters so much more than work relationships – if prediction market topics are lower-priority subjects on which to exchange information, then information exchange may require the opportunities for low-opportunity-cost communication created by physical proximity. Of course, introspection suggests that genuinely creative ideas often arise from such low-opportunity-cost communication. Google’s frequent office moves and emphasis on product innovation may provide an ideal testing ground in which to better understand the creative process.

PAPER BODY: In the last 4 years, many large firms have begun experimenting with internal prediction markets run among their employees. The primary goal of these markets is to generate predictions that efficiently aggregate many employees’ information and augment existing forecasting methods. […] In this paper, we argue that in addition to making predictions, internal prediction can provide insight into how organizations process information. Prediction markets provide employees with incentives for truthful revelation and can capture changes in opinion at a much higher frequency than surveys, allowing one to track how information moves around an organization and how it responds to external events. […]

We can draw two main conclusions. The first is that Google’s markets, while reasonably efficient, reveal some biases. During our study period, the internal markets overpriced securities tied to optimistic outcomes by 10 percentage points. The optimistic bias in Google’s markets was significantly greater on and following days when Google stock appreciated. Securities tied to extreme outcomes were underpriced by a smaller magnitude, and favorites were also overpriced slightly. These biases in prices were partly driven by the trading of newly hired employees- Google employees with longer tenure and more experience trading in the markets were better calibrated. Perhaps as a result, the pricing biases in Google’s markets declined over our sample period, suggesting that corporate prediction markets may perform better as collective experience increases.

The second conclusion is that opinions on specific topics are correlated among employees who are proximate in some sense. Physical proximity was the most important of the forms of proximity we studied. Physical proximity needed to be extremely close for it to matter. Using data on the precise latitude and longitude of employees’ offices, we found that prediction market positions were most correlated among employees sharing an office, that correlations declined with distance for employees on the same floor of a building, and that employees on different floors of the same building were no more correlated than employees in different cities.4 Google employees moved offices extremely frequently during our sample period (in the US, approximately once every 90 days), and we are able to use these office moves to show that our results are not simply the result of like-minded individuals being seated together. […]

Our findings contribute to three quite different literatures: on the role of optimism in entrepreneurial firms, on employee communication in organizations, and on social networks and information flows among investors. […]

The lessons of the literature informed Google CEO Eric Schmidt and Chief Economist Hal Varian’s (2005) third rule for managing knowledge workers: “Pack Them In.” Indeed, the fact that Google employees moved so frequently during our sample period suggests that considerable thought is put into optimizing physical locations. To this literature, which has largely relied on retrospective surveys to track communication, we illustrate how prediction markets can be used as high-frequency, market-incentivized surveys to track information flows in real-time. […]

Google’s prediction markets were launched in April 2005. The [Google prediction] markets are patterned on the Iowa Electronic Markets (Berg, et. al., 2001). In Google’s terminology, a market asks a question (e.g., “how many users will Gmail have?”) that has 2-5 possible mutually exclusive and completely exhaustive answers (e.g., “Fewer than X users”, “Between X and Y”, and “More than Y”). Each answer corresponds to a security that is worth a unit of currency (called a “Gooble”) if the answer turns out to be correct (and zero otherwise). Trade is conducted via a continuous double auction in each security. As on the IEM, short selling is not allowed– traders can instead exchange a Gooble for a complete set of securities and then sell the ones they choose. Likewise, they can exchange complete set of securities for currency. There is no automated market maker, but several employees did create robotic traders that sometimes played this role.

Each calendar quarter from 2005Q2 to 2007Q3 about 25-30 different markets were created. Participants received a fresh endowment of Goobles which they could invest in securities. The markets’ questions were designed so that they could all be resolved by the end of the quarter. At the end of the quarter, Goobles were converted into raffle tickets and prizes were raffled off. The prize budget was $10,000 per quarter, or about $25-100 per active trader (depending on the number active in a particular quarter). Participation was open to active employees and some contractors and vendors– out of 6,425 employees who had a prediction market account, 1,463 placed at least one trade. […]

Common types of markets included those forecasting demand (e.g., the number of users for a product) and internal performance (e.g., a product’s quality rating, whether a product would leave beta on time). […]

In addition, about 30 percent of Google’s markets were so-called “fun” markets –markets on subjects of interest to its employees but with no clear connection to its business (e.g., the quality of Star Wars Episode III, gas prices, the federal funds rate). Other firms experimenting with prediction markets that we are aware of have avoided these markets, perhaps out of fear of appearing unserious. Interestingly, we find that volume in “fun” and “serious” markets are positively correlated (at the daily, weekly, and monthly frequencies), suggesting that the former might help create, rather than crowd out, liquidity for the latter. […]

Google’s prediction markets are reasonably efficient, but did exhibit four specific biases: an overpricing of favorites, short aversion, optimism, and an underpricing of extreme outcomes. New employees and inexperienced traders appear to suffer more from these biases, and as market participants gained experience over the course of our sample period, the biases become less pronounced. […]

FOOT NOTE: One trader in Google’s markets wrote a trading robot that was extremely prolific and ended up participating in about half of all trades. Many of these trades exploited arbitrage opportunities available from simultaneously selling all securities in a bundle. In order to avoid having this trader dominate the (trade-weighted) results in Table 9, we include a dummy variable to control for him or her. None of the results discussed in the above paragraph are sensitive to removing this dummy variable.

APPENDIX:

Google Chart 1

Google Chart 2

Bo Cowgill&#8217-s precision point on micro-geography:

Below you can see a snapshot of trading in one of our offices. The areas where employees are making profitable decisions is green, and the areas where employees are making unprofitable decisions is red. There are about 16 profitable traders in that big green blotch in the middle!

Chart of the Day: Information Sharing at Google

More information from our previous blog post on the Google paper

Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence from Google – (PDF file – PDF file) – by Bo Cowgill, Justin Wolfers, and Eric Zitwewitz – 2008-01-06

Consensus Point wins… NewsFutures and others lose…

No Gravatar

David Perry (of Consensus Point) has just clinched a deal.

I have told you many times that David Perry is a very gifted salesperson and business executive. Under-rate him at your own risk.

UPDATE: I&#8217-m told it&#8217-s a nano deal. :-D

Using enterprise prediction markets too early in the innovation process is BAD.

No Gravatar

Jed Christiansen:

I don&#8217-t think that prediction markets need to be the incentive.

I think that when it comes to generating ideas, you need to be as open and inclusive as possible. The process should allow anyone that submits or helps develop an idea to share in any rewards from that idea. Once it&#8217-s developed, then it can move to a stage where you can do forecasting via a prediction market.

Using a prediction market too early can do two things:
1- Poor forecasting due to social influence.
2- Limit revolutionary new ideas.
It&#8217-s too easy to short an idea that looks strange, when in fact it looks odd because it&#8217-s revolutionary. The idea process should foster and develop ideas, not make them compete against each other.

I&#8217-m glad to have sparked a little discussion here.

Previously: Innovation Mechanism = Voting Mechanism + Prediction Market Mechanism

Innovation Mechanism = Voting Mechanism + Prediction Market Mechanism

No Gravatar

Xpree&#8217-s Mat Fogarty (responding to Jed Christiansen, even though Jed didn&#8217-t talk to him but to Emile Servan-Schreiber :-D &#8212-argh, kids, today, interrupting adults&#8217- conversations :-D ):

We have had success combining voting to rank the ideas, then prediction markets to analyze the potential of the top ranked ideas. The phrasing in the prediction market needs to be quite specific, if we invested in idea A, how long would it take to get to market? how much would we sell in the first year? If the company does not invest in idea A, then the money bet in the market is returned to the user.

With long development cycles this can be challenging as it requires keeping the market active until ship, or for the sales estimate, one year after ship.

Of course, you could use a preference market – but this has issues of information cascades and rewarding of group think.

Xpree

Here&#8217-s the Xpree stuff which Mat is talking about.

Previous blog posts by Chris F. Masse:

  • Since YooPick opened their door, Midas Oracle has been getting, daily, 2 or 3 dozens referrals from FaceBook.
  • US presidential hopeful John McCain hates the Midas Oracle bloggers.
  • If you have tried to contact Chris Masse thru the Midas Oracle Contact Form, I’m terribly sorry to inform you that your message was not delivered to the recipient.
  • THE CFTC’s SECRET AGENDA —UNVEILED.
  • “Over a ten-year period commencing on January 1, 2008, and ending on December 31, 2017, the S & P 500 will outperform a portfolio of funds of hedge funds, when performance is measured on a basis net of fees, costs and expenses.”
  • Meet professor Thomas W. Malone (on the right), from the MIT’s Center for Collective Intelligence.
  • Tom W. Bell rebuts the puritan and sterile petition organized by the American Enterprise Institute (which has on its payroll Paul Wolfowitz, the bright masterminder of the Iraq war).

Insider Trading and Private Prediction Markets

No Gravatar

People who run in-house, corporate prediction markets have told me that U.S. laws against illegal insider trading give them nightmares. The problem arises because a private prediction market typically generates material nonpublic information about the corporation that hosts it. If somebody misuses that information to time the purchase or sale of the corporation&#8217-s stock, liability for illegal insider trading could follow.

I plan to say a great deal more about this problem, and some proposed cures, in a paper I&#8217-m writing for the Journal of Prediction Markets. In very brief, I propose several strategies that should help to mitigate the risks that private prediction markets create under illegal insider trading laws:

  • Segregate markets for traditional insiders from other markets.
  • Broaden safeguards against illegal insider trading to reach beyond traditional insiders.
  • Treat the market&#8217-s claims and prices as trade secrets.
  • Set up decoy claims and prices.

Alternatively, of course, a corporation could simply make public the claims and prices of its in-house prediction market. Illegal insider trading laws only speak to material nonpublic information, after all. It seems very unlikely that any corporation would willing disclose so much and such probative information about its management, however.

[Crossposted at Agoraphilia and Midas Oracle.]

Previous blog posts by Tom W. Bell:

  • Let’s Tell the CFTC Where to Go.
  • Let Prediction Markets Fight Terrorism.
  • Protecting Private Prediction Markets
  • Building Exits into CFTC Regulation
  • Getting from Collective Intelligence to Collective Action
  • Quake Markets
  • Presentation of Private Prediction Markets’ Legality Under U.S. Law

Inkling Markets GodFather Speaks Out.

No Gravatar

Taking his propos and applying them to Adam Siegel and Nate Kontny, you&#8217-d get that:

  • The key is Adam Siegel and Nate Kontny&#8217-s determination. They refuse to fail.
  • The key for Nate Kontny was to find out a good co-founder &#8212-that was Adam Siegel.
  • [M]arket is the biggest determinant in the outcome of successful startups. […] Smart people [like Adam Siegel and Nate Kontny] will find big markets.

Same things could be said of David Perry and Ken Kittlitz, or Emile Servan-Schreiber and Maurice Balick.

Deep Throat on the journalists fatigue for reporting on prediction markets

No Gravatar

When we recently talked to a MSM reporter for a major article, he/she specifically said he/she didn&#8217-t want to write about public prediction exchanges because &#8220-there is nothing new there,&#8221- and was even hesitant to write about the activities of certain private, high-tech companies because they already have a reputation for &#8220-trying anything.&#8221- If that attitude is prevalent among other journalists, there may already be a fatigue setting in which is why you saw very little interest in the latest WSJ article on political prediction markets. Thinking about the readership of the major business press, through several feature articles there is already an awareness about the basics. There is limited return in writing yet another: &#8220-people are trading on everything from housing futures to political candidates, isn&#8217-t that amazing?&#8221-

There also seems to be very little innovation coming from the major public exchanges. When&#8217-s the last time any of the major prediction exchanges did anything truly noteworthy with their platform that was worth writing about? […]

The novelty of it all is wearing off, the &#8220-wisdom of crowds&#8221- stories have been done, and the public exchanges are going to need to come up with Act II, either through innovation, new content strategies, or partnerships.