Quit mulling over the VP-choice prediction markets, todays real story is in the election winner markets.

No Gravatar

I would suggest that the VP selections and the performance of the VP-choice markets at InTrade and elsewhere lend some validity to Chris Masse&#8217-s views on such markets. But enough about the VP markets, already. The interesting developments are in the election-winner markets.

Price for 2008 Republican VP Nominee (others upon request)(expired at convention) at intrade.com

Since just after 2 PM Irish time, when the NEW.REP.VP.PALIN contract briefly fell into the 20s (rumors had it that Palin wasn&#8217-t on a plane to Dayton- subsequently established that the rumor was not true), the contract turned sharply up to about 98 and stayed there until the selection was made official.

During that same time period, the &#8220-Obama wins&#8221- contract has slipped down a few percentages and the &#8220-McCain wins&#8221- contract is up a few percentages. Since at most VP selections are typically expected to affect final vote totals by 2 or 3 percent, the fact that the Obama and McCain contracts (which are winner-take-all, not vote-share contracts) have moved by 2 or 3 percent themselves suggests the markets think Palin is a fairly strong choice.

(But as I write this, the Obama contract is rallying back. Live blogging the prediction markets is hazardous stuff.)

Price for 2008 Presidential Election Winner (Individual) at intrade.com

Price for 2008 Presidential Election Winner (Individual) at intrade.com

UPDATE: As of Tuesday morning, both presidential markets have slid back to their pre-Palin-announcement levels, but active trading suggests continued disagreement about the information trickling into the market. Also interesting, activity has continued on the NEW-REP-VP-PALIN contract, with the price dipping below 95 (but back to 97 as I write).  Since that contract expires at the convention – i.e. in a day or two – some folks are betting Palin will be off the ticket fast.

The InTrade .NET charting system is a great improvement for prediction market journalism.

No Gravatar

One word: FANTASTIC.

Much improved.

  1. A prediction market blogger can hot-link to the advanced chart.
  2. The advanced chart is the by-default chart &#8212-both prices and volumes are chartered. [Thin volumes don’t appear, though.]
  3. The advanced chart is of the right width &#8212-not too small, not too big.

What remains to be improved:

  1. InTrade should publish chart widgets, so that the weblink to the prediction market webpage is automatically embedded in the chart.
  2. InTrade should publish expired charts of the closed prediction markets. Discussions about accuracy should be supported visually.
  3. InTrade should develop dynamic compound chart widgets with customizable news markers.

I hope we will get improvement on these fronts, soon.

InTrade DOT NET – www.intrade.net

No Gravatar

This post is a very short review of their new website. I might publish a deeper review, later on.

The log line is that InTrade CEO John Delaney has ingested all the innovations that HubDub has brought to the prediction market scene since January 2007 (e.g., long and rich prediction market webpages that are indexed by the search engines, and use of social networking to boost trading) and has asked his technological team to clone those innovations for InTrade. This is great. I also appreciate that their charting system is satisfying. (The advanced charts seem to be of the right size, I have noticed. Neither too small, nor too big.)

On the negative side, the execution is not as good as it should be &#8212-and I&#8217-m polite. But to be fair with them, they say their website is still in &#8220-beta&#8221- &#8212-so let&#8217-s give them time to improve their work.

Overall, it&#8217-s a good move, and it shows, as I have said for months, that Nigel Eccles of HubDub is having a profound impact on the prediction market industry.

UPDATE: I forgot to mention that InTrade.net presents probabilities expressed in percentage, not prices, which they also took from HubDub.

How do InTrades prediction markets work, and are they really accurate?

No Gravatar

Thanks to the InTrade person who uploaded the first CNBC segment on YouTube, and fixed the initial technical problem.

I renew my asking for the second CNBC segment to be uploaded at YouTube, too. [If someone else than InTrade does it, please hit me with the YouTube URL. Thanks.]

My analysis:

  1. InTrade-TradeSports CEO John Delaney does a good job explaining the mechanism of the wisdom of crowds.
  2. They cut professor Justin Wolfers too short. It&#8217-s a nuclear disaster &#8212-once again. Justin Wolfers is an admirable and ultra friendly person, a great prediction market researcher, a good prediction market analyst, and a wonderful blogger, but his TV appearances are, so far, totally crappy. The guy needs to hire a publicist who will teach him to flatten his Australian accent and to talk straight and plain &#8212-to go to the point real quick.
  3. &#8220-It seems like someone at CNBC decided at some point that they would NEVER address the legality issue.&#8221- – Dixit Deep Throat.
  4. After the broadcast of the video shot in Ireland, the camera goes back to the TV set, and, at this point, the comments from the journalists and the guest (Steve Forbes) show that they still don&#8217-t understand fully the prediction markets. They don&#8217-t have the right facts, and their analysis is not crystal clear.
  5. Overall, a good explainer on the prediction markets &#8212-taken into account that CNBC is an entertainment media. For deeper explainers, see the Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, or Midas Oracle.

YouTube video (the last part was censored by InTrade-TradeSports CEO John Delaney – PRECISION: the discussion between the journalists and the guest on the TV set was suppressed)

APPENDIX: CNBC video + CNBC video #2

UPDATE: The second CNBC video segment that TradeSports-InTrade CEO John Delaney does not want you to see on YouTube

INTRADE-TRADESPORTS CEO JOHN DELANEY CENSORS CNBC ON YOUTUBE.

No Gravatar

HE CENSORS THE END OF THE FIRST CNBC VIDEO SEGMENT TO FIT HIS MARKETING AGENDA.

HE ORDERS THAT THE SECOND CNBC VIDEO SEGMENT NOT TO BE UPLOADED ON YOUTUBE.

THE PROOF OF THE CENSORSHIP:

YouTube video (whose last part was censored by InTrade-TradeSports CEO John Delaney – PRECISION: the discussion between the journalists and the guest on the TV set was suppressed)

PLEASE, SOMEBODY, DO UPLOAD THE FULL VIDEO SEGMENT ON YOUTUBE, UNCENSORED, AND HIT ME WITH ITS URL. I&#8217-LL RE-EMBED IT FOR EVERYONE TO SEE. THERE IS NO CENSORSHIP ON MIDAS ORACLE. WE ARE NEITHER IN CHINA NOR IN IRELAND. WE ARE FREE WORLD&#8217-S CITIZENS. WE WANT TO SEE THE NAKED TRUTH, NOT DOCTORED TAPES.

The second CNBC video segment that TradeSports-InTrade CEO John Delaney does not want you to see on YouTube

APPENDIX: CNBC video + CNBC video #2

APPENDIX: THE ULTIMATE THING THAT TRADESPORTS-INTRADE CEO JOHN DELANEY WANTED TO CENSOR BUT COULDN&#8217-T THANKS TO MIDAS ORACLE.

InTrades market data shows that the sliding Dow Jones Industrial Average has an exceptionally strong negative correlation (approx. -0.91 over the last 10 weeks) with the rise in the InTrade Market for Barack Obama to be the next US President.

No Gravatar

UPDATE: Some smart comments, just below&#8230-

Jason Ruspini will answer SOME of these CFTC questions. – 12 days left, Jason.

No Gravatar

CFTC – (PDF file):

CFTC&#8217-s Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts

V. Issues for Comment

A. Request for Comment

The following questions consider the Commission&#8217-s regulatory purview over event contracts, the interests that may appropriately underlie Commission-regulated transactions, and the appropriate regulatory treatment of event contracts. The Commission encourages comments on the specific questions posed, as well as the broad range of issues raised in this concept release. In providing comments, please describe your relevant experience and discuss in detail the facts and legal provisions that support your conclusions. Furthermore, please consider the Commission&#8217-s mandate to protect commodity futures and options markets and customers, and ensure the integrity of the commodity derivatives marketplace, as well as the expected effects of any Commission action on competition, efficiency, innovation and the financial integrity of transactions. Any recommendation with respect to the regulatory treatment of event contracts and markets should be consistent with and supported by the Act, practical, and amenable to effective and efficient implementation.

B. Public Interest

1. What public interests are served by event contracts that are designed and will principally be traded for information aggregation purposes and not for commercial risk management or pricing purposes?

2. How are these interests consistent with the public interest goals embodied in the Act?

3. What calculations, analyses, variables, and factors could be used to objectively determine the social value of information to the general public that may be discovered through trading in event contracts? Should this be a factor in determining whether the Commission plays a role in regulating these markets?

C. Jurisdictional Determinations

4. What characteristics or traits are common to or should be used to identify event contracts and event markets?

5. How do these characteristics and traits differ from those of commodity futures and options contracts that customarily have been regulated by the Commission? How are they similar?

6. Are there criteria based on the provisions of the Act that could be used to make jurisdictional determinations with respect to event contracts and markets?

7. Given the purposes and history of the Act, would it be appropriate for the Commission to apply a test premised on commercial risk management or pricing functions to demarcate the Commission&#8217-s jurisdiction over particular contracts? If so, what factors could be used to make such a determination?

8. Given the purposes and history of the Act, would it be appropriate for the Commission to apply any test premised on the economic purpose of certain types of transactions to demarcate the Commission&#8217-s jurisdiction over particular contracts? If so, what factors could be used to make such a determination?

9. What calculations, analyses, variables and factors would be appropriate in determining whether the impact of an occurrence or contingency will result in a financial, commercial or economic consequence that is identified in Section 1a(13) of the Act?

10. What calculations, analyses, variables, and factors would be appropriate in determining whether an economic or commercial index that is based on prices, rates, values, or levels should or should not qualify as an excluded commodity under Section 1a(13) of the Act?

11. What identifiable factors, statutorily based or otherwise, limit the events and measures that may underlie event contracts when such contracts are treated as Commission-regulated transactions?

12. What objective and readily identifiable factors, statutorily based or otherwise, could be used to distinguish event contracts that could appropriately be traded under Commission oversight from transactions that may be viewed as the functional equivalent of gambling?

13. The Commission notes that Section 12(e) of the Act generally provides that the CEA supersedes and preempts other laws, including state and local gaming and bucket shop laws, with respect to transactions executed on or subject to the rules of a Commission-regulated market, or with respect to transactions exempted from the Act pursuant to the Commission&#8217-s exemptive authority under Section 4(c) of the Act. What are the implications of possibly preempting state gaming laws with respect to event contracts and markets that are treated as Commission-regulated or exempted transactions?

14. Should certain underlying events or measures &#8211-such as those based on assassinations or terrorist activities&#8211- be prohibited altogether due to the social perception and impact of such events? What statutory or other legal basis would support this treatment?

15. Are there event contracts, such as political event contracts, that should be prohibited from trading under the Act, or that deserve separate treatment or consideration, due to the nature and importance of their outcomes? What statutory or other legal basis would support this treatment?

D. Legal Implementation

16. Is it appropriate for the Commission to direct certain or all event contracts onto markets that are regulated differently from and perhaps less stringently than DCMs? For example, it may be warranted or necessary to treat event markets that aggregate information solely for academic or research purposes, event markets set-up for internal corporate purposes, or event markets that offer exceedingly low notional value contracts to traders differently than markets that possess the attributes of traditional DCMs.

17. Is it appropriate for the Commission to use the Section 4(c) exemptive authority of the Act for implementing a regulatory scheme for event contracts and markets? In this regard, the Commission notes that it has the discretion to grant an exemption under Section 4(c) to certain classes of transactions without having to make a determination as to whether such transactions are subject to the Act in the first instance.

18. Is the issuance of staff no-action relief, such as the relief issued to the IEM, an appropriate or preferable means for establishing regulatory certainty for event contracts and markets? Is a policy statement appropriate or preferable?

19. What are the benefits and drawbacks of permitting certain event markets to operate pursuant to Commission established conditions that are similar to the conditions under which the IEM operates?

E. Market Participants

20. Would it be appropriate to allow market participants, and in particular, retail customers, to trade on Commission-regulated event markets with the knowledge that the Commission may not be able to effectively monitor the measures or events that underlie certain event contracts?

21. What unique protections and prophylactic measures are appropriate or necessary for the protection of retail users of event contracts and markets?

22. What are the implications of permitting the intermediation of event contracts, including intermediation on behalf of retail market participants, both with respect to trade execution and clearing?

23. Are there any types of trader or intermediary conduct, peculiar to event contracts and markets, that should be prohibited or monitored closely by regulators?

24. What other factors could impact the Commission&#8217-s ability, given its limited resources, to properly oversee or monitor trading in event contracts?

THE MIDAS ORACLE TAKES:

– CALL TO ACTION: Let&#8217-s fight so that the CFTC allows the FOR-PROFIT prediction exchanges to deal with &#8220-event markets&#8221-.

– In the for-profit vs not-for-profit debate, our prediction market luminaries, doctored by Bob, are on the wrong side of the issue.

– COMMENTS TO THE CFTC: What to expect from Tom W. Bell and Jason Ruspini

BACKGROUND INFO:

CFTC’s Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts&#8230- notably how they define &#8220-event markets&#8221-, how they are going to extend their &#8220-exemption&#8221- to other IEM-like prediction exchanges, and how they framed their questions to the public. Here are the comments to the CFTC.

– The Arnold &amp- Porter lawyers explain the meaning of the CFTC&#8217-s concept release on &#8220-event markets&#8221-. &#8212- (PDF file)

– What Vernon Smith told the CFTC.

American Enterprise Institute’s proposals to legalize the real-money prediction markets in the United States of America

Will the CFTC allow FOR-PROFIT prediction exchanges to deal with event markets?

No Gravatar

The feedback I have received about my speculative post is that I put too much weight into the CFTC requesting that the prediction exchanges organizing &#8220-event markets&#8221- (event derivative markets that can&#8217-t be used for hedging risks) be not for profit &#8212-as the Iowa Electronic Markets is.

Just below, in bold, are the phrase and the word I&#8217-m told I have mis-read.

CFTC – (PDF file):

CFTC&#8217-s Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts

D. Legal Implementation

16. Is it appropriate for the Commission to direct certain or all event contracts onto markets that are regulated differently from and perhaps less stringently than DCMs? For example, it may be warranted or necessary to treat event markets that aggregate information solely for academic or research purposes, event markets set-up for internal corporate purposes, or event markets that offer exceedingly low notional value contracts to traders differently than markets that possess the attributes of traditional DCMs.

19. What are the benefits and drawbacks of permitting certain event markets to operate pursuant to Commission established conditions that are similar to the conditions under which the IEM operates?

UPDATE: CALL TO ACTION: Let&#8217-s fight so that the CFTC allows the FOR-PROFIT prediction exchanges to deal with &#8220-event markets&#8221-.

UPDATE: NOT-FOR-PROFIT&#8230- or&#8230- FOR-PROFIT&#8230- That is the question.

UPDATE: In the for-profit vs not-for-profit debate, our prediction market luminaries, doctored by Bob, are on the wrong side of the issue.

The lawyerly questions that the CFTC are asking to Tom W. Bell

No Gravatar

CFTC – (PDF file):

CFTC&#8217-s Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts

V. Issues for Comment

A. Request for Comment

The following questions consider the Commission&#8217-s regulatory purview over event contracts, the interests that may appropriately underlie Commission-regulated transactions, and the appropriate regulatory treatment of event contracts. The Commission encourages comments on the specific questions posed, as well as the broad range of issues raised in this concept release. In providing comments, please describe your relevant experience and discuss in detail the facts and legal provisions that support your conclusions. Furthermore, please consider the Commission&#8217-s mandate to protect commodity futures and options markets and customers, and ensure the integrity of the commodity derivatives marketplace, as well as the expected effects of any Commission action on competition, efficiency, innovation and the financial integrity of transactions. Any recommendation with respect to the regulatory treatment of event contracts and markets should be consistent with and supported by the Act, practical, and amenable to effective and efficient implementation.

B. Public Interest

1. What public interests are served by event contracts that are designed and will principally be traded for information aggregation purposes and not for commercial risk management or pricing purposes?

2. How are these interests consistent with the public interest goals embodied in the Act?

3. What calculations, analyses, variables, and factors could be used to objectively determine the social value of information to the general public that may be discovered through trading in event contracts? Should this be a factor in determining whether the Commission plays a role in regulating these markets?

C. Jurisdictional Determinations

4. What characteristics or traits are common to or should be used to identify event contracts and event markets?

5. How do these characteristics and traits differ from those of commodity futures and options contracts that customarily have been regulated by the Commission? How are they similar?

6. Are there criteria based on the provisions of the Act that could be used to make jurisdictional determinations with respect to event contracts and markets?

7. Given the purposes and history of the Act, would it be appropriate for the Commission to apply a test premised on commercial risk management or pricing functions to demarcate the Commission&#8217-s jurisdiction over particular contracts? If so, what factors could be used to make such a determination?

8. Given the purposes and history of the Act, would it be appropriate for the Commission to apply any test premised on the economic purpose of certain types of transactions to demarcate the Commission&#8217-s jurisdiction over particular contracts? If so, what factors could be used to make such a determination?

9. What calculations, analyses, variables and factors would be appropriate in determining whether the impact of an occurrence or contingency will result in a financial, commercial or economic consequence that is identified in Section 1a(13) of the Act?

10. What calculations, analyses, variables, and factors would be appropriate in determining whether an economic or commercial index that is based on prices, rates, values, or levels should or should not qualify as an excluded commodity under Section 1a(13) of the Act?

11. What identifiable factors, statutorily based or otherwise, limit the events and measures that may underlie event contracts when such contracts are treated as Commission-regulated transactions?

12. What objective and readily identifiable factors, statutorily based or otherwise, could be used to distinguish event contracts that could appropriately be traded under Commission oversight from transactions that may be viewed as the functional equivalent of gambling?

13. The Commission notes that Section 12(e) of the Act generally provides that the CEA supersedes and preempts other laws, including state and local gaming and bucket shop laws, with respect to transactions executed on or subject to the rules of a Commission-regulated market, or with respect to transactions exempted from the Act pursuant to the Commission&#8217-s exemptive authority under Section 4(c) of the Act. What are the implications of possibly preempting state gaming laws with respect to event contracts and markets that are treated as Commission-regulated or exempted transactions?

14. Should certain underlying events or measures &#8211-such as those based on assassinations or terrorist activities&#8211- be prohibited altogether due to the social perception and impact of such events? What statutory or other legal basis would support this treatment?

15. Are there event contracts, such as political event contracts, that should be prohibited from trading under the Act, or that deserve separate treatment or consideration, due to the nature and importance of their outcomes? What statutory or other legal basis would support this treatment?

D. Legal Implementation

16. Is it appropriate for the Commission to direct certain or all event contracts onto markets that are regulated differently from and perhaps less stringently than DCMs? For example, it may be warranted or necessary to treat event markets that aggregate information solely for academic or research purposes, event markets set-up for internal corporate purposes, or event markets that offer exceedingly low notional value contracts to traders differently than markets that possess the attributes of traditional DCMs.

17. Is it appropriate for the Commission to use the Section 4(c) exemptive authority of the Act for implementing a regulatory scheme for event contracts and markets? In this regard, the Commission notes that it has the discretion to grant an exemption under Section 4(c) to certain classes of transactions without having to make a determination as to whether such transactions are subject to the Act in the first instance.

18. Is the issuance of staff no-action relief, such as the relief issued to the IEM, an appropriate or preferable means for establishing regulatory certainty for event contracts and markets? Is a policy statement appropriate or preferable?

19. What are the benefits and drawbacks of permitting certain event markets to operate pursuant to Commission established conditions that are similar to the conditions under which the IEM operates?

E. Market Participants

20. Would it be appropriate to allow market participants, and in particular, retail customers, to trade on Commission-regulated event markets with the knowledge that the Commission may not be able to effectively monitor the measures or events that underlie certain event contracts?

21. What unique protections and prophylactic measures are appropriate or necessary for the protection of retail users of event contracts and markets?

22. What are the implications of permitting the intermediation of event contracts, including intermediation on behalf of retail market participants, both with respect to trade execution and clearing?

23. Are there any types of trader or intermediary conduct, peculiar to event contracts and markets, that should be prohibited or monitored closely by regulators?

24. What other factors could impact the Commission&#8217-s ability, given its limited resources, to properly oversee or monitor trading in event contracts?