Peter Schiff (November 13, 2009):
Peter Schiff (November 9, 2009) on US dollar carry trade:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Schiff
He is running for US Senate:
Peter Schiff (November 13, 2009):
Peter Schiff (November 9, 2009) on US dollar carry trade:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Schiff
He is running for US Senate:
OboPay –- (via Park Paradigm, who invested in it):
With OboPay you can instantly pay back a friend, split a dinner bill, get money from your parents, get quick cash, pay up or collect on a friendly wager, track purchases, check your balance, and much, much more. And, you can do it all from your phone– anywhere, anytime with anyone.
Would it work for real-money prediction markets (InTrade, BetFair, etc.)?
Political prediction markets react (with a small delay) to political polls —-just like the political experts and the mass media do, too. Hence, in order to discover their true social utility, the prediction markets (which are tools of intelligence) should not be compared to the polls (which are just facts) but to the similar meta intelligence mechanisms (the averaged probabilistic predictions from a large panel of experts, or the averaged probabilistic predictions from the political reporters in the mass media, or else). My bet is that, in complicated situations (such as the 2008 Democratic primary), the prediction markets beat the mass media (in terms of velocity) —-even though the prediction markets are not omniscient and not completely objective (but who is?).
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You might remember the research article that I have blogged about:
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Learning in Investment Decisions: Evidence from Prediction Markets and Polls – (PDF file) – David S. Lee and Enrico Moretti – 2008-12-XX
In this paper, we explore how polls and prediction markets interact in the context of the 2008 U.S. Presidential election. We begin by presenting some evidence on the relative predictive power of polls and prediction markers. If almost all of the information that is relevant for predicting electoral outcomes is not captured in polling, then there is little reason to believe that prediction market prices should co-move with contemporaneous polling. If, at the other extreme, there is no useful information beyond what is already summarized by the current polls, then market prices should react to new polling information in a particular way. Using both a random walk and a simple autoregressive model, we find that the latter view appears more consistent with the data. Rather than anticipating significant changes in voter sentiment, the market price appears to be reacting to the release of the polling information.
We then outline and test a more formal model of investor learning. In the model, investors have a prior on the probability of victory of each candidate, and in each period they update this probability after receiving a noisy signal in the form of a poll. This Bayesian model indicates that the market price should be a function of the prior and each of the available signals, with weights reflecting their relative precision. It also indicates that more precise polls (i.e. polls with larger sample size) and earlier polls should have more effect on market prices, everything else constant. The empirical evidence is generally, although not completely, supportive of the predictions of the Bayesian model.
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You might also have watched Emile Servan-Schreiber’-s videos. Emile is a smart man, and those videos are truly instructive.
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Lance Fortnow gives a good insight about the relationship between polls and prediction markets (see his last paragraph).
Yesterday the Electoral College delegates voted, 365 for Barack Obama and 173 for John McCain. How did the markets do?
To compare, here is my map the night before the election and the final results. The leaning category had Obama at 364. The markets leaned the wrong way for Missouri and Indiana, their 11 electoral votes canceling each other out. The extra vote for Obama came from a quirk in Nebraska that the Intrade markets didn’-t cover: Nebraska splits their votes based on congressional delegations, one of which went to Obama.
Indiana and Missouri were the most likely Republican and Democratic states to switch sides according to the markets, which mean the markets did very well this year again. Had every state leaned the right way (again), one would wonder if the probabilities in each state had any meaning beyond being above or below 50%.
Many argue the markets just followed the predictions based on polls like Nate Silver’-s fivethirtyeight.com. True to a point, Silver did amazingly well and the markets smartly trusted him. But the markets also did very well in 2004 without Silver. [Chris Masse’s remark: In 2004, Electoral-Vote.com (another poll aggregator) was all the rage.] One can aggregate polls and other information using hours upon hours of analysis or one can just trust the markets to get essentially equally good results with little effort.
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The polls are facts. Prediction markets are meta to facts. Prediction markets are intelligence tools. Let’-s compare them with similar intelligence tools.
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Lance Fortnow’-s post attracted an interesting comment from one of his readers:
to provide an exciting collection of political and other prediction markets.
These markets are as much a “-prediction”- tool as a wind vane or outdoor thermometer are. They moved up and down according to the daily trends, with very little insight of the longer place phenomena underlying them.
When the weather was hot (Palin’-s nomination announcement) the market swinged widely towards McCain, while ignoring the cold front on the way here (the economic recession + Palin inexperience).
The value of weather forecast is in telling us things we didn’-t know. We don’-t need to trade securities to believe that if McCain is closing on the polls then his chances of wining are higher (duh!), which is what the markets did. We need sophisticated prediction mechanisms to tell us how the worsening economic conditions, the war in Iraq and Palin ineptitude (which in pre-Couric days wasn’-t as well established) will impact this election, today poll’-s be damned.
Looking at the actions by the republican teams, who were trying to read past the daily trend all the way to November 4th, it is clear that they thought all along they were losing by a fair margin. Because of this is they choose moderate, maverick McCain, went for the Palin hail mary fumble^H^H^H^H^H pass and the put-the-campaign-on-hold move.
A full two weeks before the election the McCain team concluded the election was unwinnable, while the electoral college market was still giving 25-35% odds to McCain.
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As highlighted in bold, the commenter says two things:
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My replies to his/her points:
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The emergence of the social utility of the prediction markets will come more clearly to people once we:
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APPENDIX:
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#1. Explainer On Prediction Markets
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Prediction markets produce dynamic, objective probabilistic predictions on the outcomes of future events by aggregating disparate pieces of information that traders bring when they agree on prices. Prediction markets are meta forecasting tools that feed on the advanced indicators (i.e., the primary sources of information). Garbage in, garbage out…- Intelligence in, intelligence out…-
A prediction market is a market for a contract that yields payments based on the outcome of a partially uncertain future event, such as an election. A contract pays $100 only if candidate X wins the election, and $0 otherwise. When the market price of an X contract is $60, the prediction market believes that candidate X has a 60% chance of winning the election. The price of this event derivative can be interpreted as the objective probability of the future outcome (i.e., its most statistically accurate forecast). A 60% probability means that, in a series of events each with a 60% probability, then 6 times out of 10, the favored outcome will occur- and 4 times out of 10, the unfavored outcome will occur.
Each prediction exchange organizes its own set of real-money and/or play-money markets, using either a CDA or a MSR mechanism.
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More Info:
– The Best Resources On Prediction Markets = The Best External Web Links + The Best Midas Oracle Posts
– Prediction Market Science
– The Midas Oracle Explainers On Prediction Markets
– All The Midas Oracle Explainers On Prediction Markets
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#2. Probabilistic Predictions = Charts Of Prediction Markets
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Put your mouse on your selected chart, right-click, and open the link in another browser tab to get directed to the prediction market page of your favorite exchange.
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2008 US Elections
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InTrade
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2008 US Electoral College
2008 Electoral Map Prediction = InTrade – Electoral College Prediction Markets = Probabilistic predictions for the 2008 US presidential elections based on market data from InTrade Ireland = electoralmarkets.com
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– This is a dynamic chart, which is up to date. Click on the image, and open the website in another browser tab to get the bigger version.
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#1. Explainer On Prediction Markets
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Prediction markets produce dynamic, objective probabilistic predictions on the outcomes of future events by aggregating disparate pieces of information that traders bring when they agree on prices. Prediction markets are meta forecasting tools that feed on the advanced indicators (i.e., the primary sources of information). Garbage in, garbage out…- Intelligence in, intelligence out…-
A prediction market is a market for a contract that yields payments based on the outcome of a partially uncertain future event, such as an election. A contract pays $100 only if candidate X wins the election, and $0 otherwise. When the market price of an X contract is $60, the prediction market believes that candidate X has a 60% chance of winning the election. The price of this event derivative can be interpreted as the objective probability of the future outcome (i.e., its most statistically accurate forecast). A 60% probability means that, in a series of events each with a 60% probability, then 6 times out of 10, the favored outcome will occur- and 4 times out of 10, the unfavored outcome will occur.
Each prediction exchange organizes its own set of real-money and/or play-money markets, using either a CDA or a MSR mechanism.
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More Info:
– The Best Resources On Prediction Markets = The Best External Web Links + The Best Midas Oracle Posts
– Prediction Market Science
– The Midas Oracle Explainers On Prediction Markets
– All The Midas Oracle Explainers On Prediction Markets
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#2. Probabilistic Predictions = Charts Of Prediction Markets
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Put your mouse on your selected chart, right-click, and open the link in another browser tab to get directed to the prediction market page of your favorite exchange.
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InTrade
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2008 US Electoral College
2008 Electoral Map Prediction = InTrade – Electoral College Prediction Markets = Probabilistic predictions for the 2008 US presidential elections based on market data from InTrade Ireland = electoralmarkets.com
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– This is a dynamic chart, which is up to date. Click on the image, and open the website in another browser tab to get the bigger version.
Hummmmmmmmm…- Quite a bold ambition. I’-m very surprised by his statement. Is he naive?
Via our chief economist Michael Giberson.
Based on the arguments Hedgestreet presented in its response to the CFTC on event markets, the exchange has a fairly strong justification to self-certify and begin trading election futures, soon. While most event markets trade as binary options, and the CFTC has flexible discretion over options per 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b), the Commission does not have direct discretion over approving DCM futures that conform to the Commodity Exchange Act, by 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(3). Therefore, a vote-share or electoral college future is more feasible at this moment than a winner-take-all option, although the latter is more useful as a hedging vehicle.
The major question here is what degree of trading restrictions the CFTC considers appropriate in order to fulfill the CEA’-s “-beyond the control”- criterion of excluded commodities. There is little doubt that low position limits alongside candidate death contingencies and prohibitions on trading by candidates, their staffs, members of the electoral college, and their proxies would not satisfy the CEA in this respect. The challenge lies in enforcing such trading prohibitions. I hope that Hedgestreet is in the process of developing a framework to do so. The CFTC could also issue an interpretive letter on this specific point, without addressing the more general, challenging issues related to their jurisdiction over event markets.
If Hedgestreet’-s trading restrictions are conservative and rigorous, it is improbable that such a self-certification would put Hedgestreet in bad graces with the CFTC. Alternatively, Hedgestreet could submit the futures (or options) for approval under CFTC regulation 40.3. If they do so, the CFTC has 45 days to review the products, at which point they could render a decision or extend the review process. In the meantime, however, Hedgestreet could be in communication with the CFTC and NFA concerning the development of trading restrictions, which again should be the main point of contention here, as there is no doubt that such event markets are associated with an “-economic consequence”-. Note that CME does not even believe that trading prohibitions are necessary, citing the role of the Fed in determining interest rates and the lack of problems there with respect to manipulation. I tend to believe that the Fed and interest rates is a special case, not to mention that it is treated differently in the CEA, and that it is prudent to impose special trading restrictions on political event contracts. Those restrictions, however, can remain flexible and be loosened over time, especially the position limits, as the market grows.
Given the current political climate in which the CFTC operates, the Commission may welcome such an active stance from Hedgestreet and other DCMs on this issue, as it will allow them to take a more passive role in the process. In the case of vote-share, electoral college and tax futures with appropriate trading restrictions, the Commission would simply be complying with the CEA by allowing such contracts. Allowing winner-take-all options would be incrementally more sensitive for the CFTC given their additional discretion in such cases. In any case, I think we have passed beyond the point where there is any material doubt that such markets are bona fide excluded commodities.
[Previously, my response to the CFTC, where I take a broader view with respect to jurisdiction and issues like gaming law preemption. Cross-posted from Risk Markets and Politics]
USA Today
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Previous blog posts by Chris F. Masse:
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UPDATE: Some smart comments, just below…-
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ELECTORAL COLLEGE MARKETS: Probabilistic predictions for the 2008 US presidential elections based on market data from InTrade Ireland —-(electoralmarkets.com).
By Lance Fortnow, David Pennock, and Yiling Chen.
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For more on probabilistic predictions, go to our “-Predictions”- page, or visit the prediction exchanges.
Alternatively, if you want an electoral map made of polls, go to electoral-vote.com.
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