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The New York Times on InTrades US political election prediction markets

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The NYT writers discusses 2 (different?) issues.

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#1. There was market arbitrage opportunies in the recent past between InTrade and BetFair &#8212-unlike 4 years ago, and contrary to the laws of economics.

– The price of the Barack Obama event derivative was cheaper on InTrade than on BetFair and the Iowa Electronic Markets. Conversely, the price of the John McCain event derivative was more expensive on InTrade than on BetFair and the Iowa Electronic Markets.

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#2. The NYT writer reports (without linking to it) the findings of the InTrade investigation about the behavior of their unnamed &#8220-institutional investor&#8221-.

– InTrade CEO John Delaney suggests that that institutional investor:

  1. might operate on InTrade at specific times where it might not be able to find liquidity on BetFair and/or IEM-
  2. might be a bookmaker willing to hedge its risks on a prediction exchange (a.k.a. betting exchange).

– Justin Wolfers&#8217- PHD student remarks that that institutional investor is not making an effort to shop around for the best prices, within each InTrade political prediction market.

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RELATED: See the comments on Midas Oracle here, here, here, and here.

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Political prediction markets should move beyond mere horse-race forecasts to demonstrate larger social value.

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I agree with that.

The key, now, is to go beyond the accuracy issue and to move on to the utility issue.

It&#8217-s a much complex problematic, which those who have been over-selling the prediction markets are unwilling to undertake. [*]

Maybe a small bunch of prediction market people, maybe assembled in a new prediction market structure, might go for that lofty goal of fingering the specific instances where prediction markets create real social utility.

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[*] Yelling across the harbor, like an illuminated Jesus Christ, that prediction markets can help &#8220-avoiding future [financial] crisis&#8221- is a sign that some prediction market practitioners have lost their intellectual compass. To my knowledge, InTrade hadn&#8217-t had any prediction market focused on the &#8220-looming credit crunch crisis&#8221-, last summer. Its CEO should be careful about making any grand statement. As I wrote many times, at best, the prediction markets are the best umpire you can have between either the mass media and the politicians, on one hand, and a group consisting of the best experts, on the other hand. An umpire is only useful during critical times, in a game. But, other than that, most of the times, the umpire is not the determinant of the game &#8212-the players are.

The researchers and practitioners should make a solid case for each of these critical instances where the prediction markets have a real social utility.

Stop the over-selling. Let&#8217-s start the real work.

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The gamble of downplaying manipulation

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Whether it is GOP bias, manipulation, or simply confident well-funded traders, there is some agreement that the Intrade presidential markets have been affected by &#8220-non-informational&#8221- trading. To be clear, this is not a condemnation of Intrade. The exchange&#8217-s liquidity and trader diversity are hamstrung by archaic laws in the U.S., the continuation of which will frustrate a fair assessment of market accuracy. The point is that arguing for legal and regulatory change while downplaying the viability of manipulation and other market pathologies is counterproductive.

That prediction markets may be manipulated with some persistence should be no surprise to anyone who has followed the subject in the past couple of years. Here is a sampling of some of the warnings:

The HRC attack, part 2
The Giuliani manipulator buyer is back.
Manipulation can affect prices.
Is there manipulation in the Hillary Clinton Intrade market?
Is there manipulation in the Hillary Clinton Intrade market? Redux
Measured Enthusiasm For Prediction Markets

We now even find some academic papers that admit that manipulative trading may be profitable given certain assumptions. It is up to readers to decide which papers contain the most &#8220-stylized&#8221- assumptions.

No-one argues whether, in the long run, in general, manipulation is a losing proposition that subsidizes other traders — but is it really prudent to deploy that message, in comments to CFTC for example?

First, if Obama wins the election, based on the other available markets and poll projections, it would seem that an error had been introduced into the largest and most widely-cited of prediction markets. When comparing market and poll accuracy over time we are usually talking about only a few percentage points difference, so this error isn&#8217-t trivial. Furthermore this is a market that takes place only once every four years, so long-run arguments ring a little false. There&#8217-s no reason why something similar couldn&#8217-t happen in 2012. At least, one is optimistic that the regulatory situation will improve and Intrade&#8217-s traders will be more numerous and less capital-constrained at that time, which should make manipulation more difficult on average. Those who downplay the dangers of manipulation risk such goals by sacrificing their general credibility. It&#8217-s a negative skew proposition.

Second, some markets can irreversibly affect the outcome they predict. This happens infrequently and requires some fundamental basis, but specific cases can spectacularly undermine a general argument. This is the old bit about trying to cross a river that&#8217-s three feet deep on average. An example we&#8217-ve seen recently: when a business is predicated on maintaining a deposit base or borrowing short-term at certain rates, manipulation might be irreversible if it targets confidence or attacks the business&#8217-s funding costs. In essence, the manipulator forces the (possibly quite liquid) market to &#8220-settle&#8221- as the firm approaches insolvency, and prices do not snap back. Breaking a currency peg has a similar dynamic. Now, there is currently no real analog to these situations in prediction markets as such, but either these markets will continue to be relatively small and not widely-followed, or &#8230-.

Kenneth Arrow and Intrade CEO John Delaney are making the right arguments here: transparency in the form of more public markets, along with less concentrated risk, would have helped avoid this crisis. But don&#8217-t try to sweep uncomfortable subjects under the rug. That won&#8217-t end well.

[ Orginally posted to Risk Markets and Politics on Wednesday, 10/15 ]

InTrade offers an explanation of strange trading.

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Intrade has made a statement on the unusual trading that many have noted and alleged to be manipulative. The statement suggests that the price action is mostly attributable to a single firm, a hedger &#8220-using our markets in good faith and in the ordinary course of their business.&#8221-

The first company that comes to mind is Centrist Messenger. Centrist is an interesting firm that re-sells political ad time and refunds sales to customers whose candidate loses. Centrist has stated publicly that it uses Intrade to hedge this exposure.* If Centrist had something to do with the unusual trading, it suggests that they sold more Obama than McCain ads, creating exposure to a GOP victory, resulting in McCain buys and Obama sales on Intrade. Why such a firm would be such urgent price-takers isn&#8217-t fully explained.

Whether or not it was Centrist isn&#8217-t important, but as these markets mature we should expect them to attract more hedging activity, and this might introduce persistent price distortions. Indeed it makes sense for people in the top tax bracket to be long Obama apart from considerations of his chances of victory. This is another uncomfortable subject that I&#8217-ve warned about in the past. When these markets become deeper and more widely available, the odds of the high-tax candidates might begin to show an upwards bias, a risk premium. Interestingly, Musto and Yilmaz predict that such markets will eventually lead to increased promises of redistribution by candidates. Talk about unintended consequences.

Intrade is doing the right thing here though, dealing with tough issues realistically and with as much transparency as possible. They provide valuable information, for free, even in places where they are not necessarily welcome. The depth of this information helps us to evaluate Intrade prices and have more confidence in them. Here is an example below, based on Obama&#8217-s market over the past two weeks. Some have noted that the purported attacks occurred in hours where the market was unusually thin. This chart measures such price manipulability. The red line represents the ease of a downwards attack. It is the 100 x the amount of margin required to sweep the top fifteen bids divided by the difference between the highest bid and the fifteenth highest bid. (That is, how much the probability of an Obama victory can be moved by risking $100. Commissions are not taken into account but would of course would be vital.) The green line is the ease of an upwards attack. This is a very preliminary study and I will leave it to others to voice initial impressions. The fact that we can gauge to what extent traders are exercising market power is in itself important and encouraging however.

* Technically another firm does the trading. Centrist is incorporated in the US, and the trading firm is incorporated in St. Kitts. Through this arrangement, Centrist cleverly avoids violating UIGEA.

[Cross-posted from Risk Markets and Politics ]

There is no manipulation going on in the InTrade political prediction markets.

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– InTrade CEO John Delaney has conducted an investigation on the alleged manipulation. The suspicious moves in prices were in fact caused by the buying and selling made by an &#8220-institutional&#8221- trader (a hedge fund, I presume) who has been managing &#8220-certain risks&#8221- (hedging).

– Jason Ruspini, who wrote before this report came out, does believe that manipulations &#8220-non-informational&#8221- trades have been prevalent on InTrade. (We will see whether Jason changes his mind in light of InTrade&#8217-s debunking report.)

InTrade CEO John Delaney states that prediction markets can prevent the next financial cataclysms. Surely. Prediction markets can also restore womens virginity, and treat mens baldness.

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John Delaney states rightfully that the prediction markets are a mechanism that aggregates information dispersed among the population. Then, he goes on at full throttle and states that prediction markets can help &#8220-avoiding future [financial] crisis.&#8221-

Jesus, Mary, Joseph, that&#8217-s quite an extraordinary statement.

John Delaney writes that crucial information is buried deep in the accounting books. That&#8217-s true, but that&#8217-s up to the financial analysts to decipher this problematic &#8212-our event derivative traders can then just pick up on what those experts conclude. The financial experts were unable to prevent the current financial cataclysm. Adding more event derivative traders and more prediction markets won&#8217-t solve any problem.

Prediction markets are only a reflection of the current knowledge of the best experts in town. At best, they are the best umpire you can get between, on one hand, the mass media or the politicians and, on the other hand, the best experts. But when nobody knows anything (or when nobody listens to Nouriel Roubini), the prediction markets are of no help.

What the prediction market industry needs right now is not an ill-informed, bragging rant.

What the prediction market industry needs is a way to discriminate between accuracy and utility.

What we need is more of Robin Hanson.

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UPDATE:

Mystification, demystification, value assessment, and prediction markets – REDUX

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A little explainer on my previous post, as I got some feedback on it.

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#1. Yes, the measure of the usefulness of an idea or theory is the number and the quality of web links it receives.

– Google PageRank (the engine powering the world&#8217-s #1 media) organizes the world&#8217-s information according to how many links go to one source of information, and how high the social status of those links are.

– A quality document posted on the Web is always linked to &#8212-if it is not, it is not a quality document. Period.

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#2. The prediction markets should be useful to the experts [*] &#8212-otherwise, they are useless and should be terminated (as a forecasting tool).

– The lovers of the prediction markets represent a little coterie of hyper-excited economists, free-market columnists, and opportunistic bloggers.

– The high traffic to the InTrade prediction exchange website is generated out of curiosity. This is the result of the free publicity performed by researchers who live off the trading data handed out by the InTrade executives &#8212-it&#8217-s a symbiosis (&#8221-you pump up my exchange in the media- I help your academic career&#8221-).

– For the happy few who understand the mechanism of information aggregation, the prediction markets are a tool of convenience: they get all the week&#8217-s politics summed up in a number &#8212-that spare them the need to read the newspapers. The problem with that behavior is that when there is an upset, those people don&#8217-t understand why the prediction markets failed, because they didn&#8217-t pay attention to the primary indicators.

– I am aware of the vapors of some dreamers, but the fact is the polls are still the main forecasting tool in politics &#8212-and the main primary indicator of the event derivative traders. (Snake eats itself.) It&#8217-s going to stay that way, I forecast.

– In an ideal world, the prediction market scholars should be able to point to situations where some prediction markets were very useful to society and to some other situations where the prediction markets were not useful at all. We need a hierarchy of the prediction markets &#8212-based on their usefulness.

– Where are the evidence that our prediction markets provide decisive help to the experts?

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[*] “the experts” = all the experts but the prediction market experts (who are expert in nothing else than pumping up the prediction markets).

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APPENDIX

Robin Hanson:

[I]nfo value [] is the added accuracy the markets provide relative to other mechanisms, times the value of accuracy in improved decisions, minus the cost of maintaining the markets, relative to the cost of other mechanisms. A highly accurate market has little value if other mechanisms can provide similar accuracy at a lower cost, or if few substantial decisions are influenced by accurate forecasts on its topic.

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Mystification, demystification, value assessment, and prediction markets

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Justin Wolfers:

Prediction markets can yield valuable insight into the dynamics of political campaigns, a conclusion we&#8217-ve drawn from years of intensive study and research. We&#8217-ve even proselytized about the value of these markets, extolling their ability to yield sharper insights than pundits or polls. […]

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If this statement were true,

  1. Justin Wolfers&#8217- columns at the WSJ would have been linked to by the blogging political experts. They never were.
  2. The blogging political experts would have adopted the prediction market tool (over than just quoting the InTrade prices out of curiosity). They never did.

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Both the mystification of the prediction markets (mudding the primary indicators into commentary- suggesting that the traders&#8217- anticipations are always sound) and their demystification (listing the primary indicators) don&#8217-t do the trick: Economic science should be able to tell us whether the prediction markets on 2008 US elections are of high social utility, and whether other kinds of prediction markets are of higher social utility. I am not satisfied by what I have been reading, as of today. The prediction markets are rather a tool of curiosity, as of today, not much a tool of forecasting. The prediction markets are not used as a tool by the experts &#8212-by &#8220-the experts&#8221-, I mean all the experts but the prediction market experts (who are expert in nothing else than pumping up the prediction markets): the political experts, the financial experts, the management experts, the oil production experts, the credit experts, the health care system experts, the automobile market experts, the wine market experts, the web technology business experts, the web advertising experts, the medical drug experts, the foreign affairs experts, the military experts, the aviation industry experts, the condom industry experts, the restaurant industry experts, etc.

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APPENDIX

Robin Hanson:

[I]nfo value [] is the added accuracy the markets provide relative to other mechanisms, times the value of accuracy in improved decisions, minus the cost of maintaining the markets, relative to the cost of other mechanisms. A highly accurate market has little value if other mechanisms can provide similar accuracy at a lower cost, or if few substantial decisions are influenced by accurate forecasts on its topic.

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PREVIOUSLY: See Robin Hanson&#8217-s take on Google&#8217-s enterprise prediction markets.

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